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I. INTRODUCTION

The committee of creditors holding unsecured claims (hereinafter

"creditors' committee") is an increasingly important component of the
reorganization process. In cases under Chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code (hereinafter the "Bankruptcy Code")1 when a debtor in
possession is responsible for the management of the estate, creditors'
committees perform the vital function of balancing the debtor's broad
statutory authority by promoting the interests of unsecured creditors
generally, investigating the estate's assets and liabilities, and negotiating
(and, if necessary, proposing) a plan of reorganization. Moreover, when a
Chapter 11 debtor in possession is unable, or unwilling, to carry out its
statutory responsibilities, such as objecting to claims or prosecuting actions
on behalf of the estate, creditors' committees often assume these duties.
While the role of creditors' committees is far less important in cases under
Chapters 7 and 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, or in Chapter 11 cases in which
a trustee has been appointed, such committees nonetheless can be effective
advocates for the interests of their unsecured creditor constituencies.
Relatively little is recorded about the functioning of creditors'
committees in bankruptcy cases, such as how often they are appointed and
the extent of their contributions to the reorganization process. Indeed,
despite the growing importance of creditors' committees, they receive little
attention in the academic literature,2 which frequently examines the rights
of debtors and secured creditors. Nevertheless, it is useful for committee
members and their professionals (and for debtors and their professionals as
well) to examine the law as applied to creditors' committees under the
Bankruptcy Code, and to understand the rights, obligations, and limitations
of committees. This is particularly true as unsecured trade creditors and
bondholders increasingly desire to assert their influence over the bankruptcy
process, rather than to follow the course charted by debtors, trustees, and
major secured creditors.
The purpose of this Article is neither to present an empirical study of

1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (hereinafter
the "Bankruptcy Reform Act") (codified in part as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
2. See, e.g., Peter C. Blain & Diane H. O'Gawa, Creditors' Committees Under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition, Powers, and
Duties, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 581 (1990); Andrew DeNatale, The Creditors' Committee
Under the Bankruptcy Code-A Primer, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 43 (1981); see also
ANDREW DENATALE ET AL., CREDITORS' COMMITTEE MANuAL (1993).
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the effectiveness of creditors' committees in reorganization cases, nor to
propose sweeping changes in the statutes and rules governing their
existence; rather, it is to survey the existing law with respect to the
appointment, operation, authority, and duties of creditors' committees, with
particular emphasis on recent developments in case law. Where appropriate,
we also offer our own views as to current problems in the statutory and
judicially made rules governing creditors' committees and in the practical
application of these rules to real-life situations.
Given the relative importance of creditors' committees in Chapter 11
cases in which a trustee has not been appointed, the emphasis of this Article
is on that topic. Unless stated otherwise, the reader should assume that each
particular discussion herein is geared principally to those Chapter 11
committees, although creditors' committees in cases under Chapter 9
involving municipalities are in many respects similar to those established
under Chapter 11 in cases involving the reorganization of private entities.
The law governing Chapter 7 creditors' committees differs substantially in
many respects from that under Chapter 11, and such committees are
addressed only in passing herein.
II. THE ROLE OF CREDITORS' COMMITTEES GENERALLY

A. Committees Under PriorLaw
For nearly a century, creditors' committees have maintained an
increasingly significant presence in the bankruptcy process. In enacting
uniform national bankruptcy laws through the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the
"Bankruptcy Act"), 3 Congress made no mention of creditors' committees.
Such committees, however, did exist from the earliest days under the
Bankruptcy Act, although they did so only on an informal basis, and the
scope of their authority to represent creditor constituencies was somewhat
uncertain. 4 It was not until 1933 that creditors' committees received formal
statutory recognition, when Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to allow
committees "supervisory or other control over the debtor's business" in

3. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-171, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)) (repealed 1978 by Bankruptcy Reform Act § 401(a)).
4. See, e.g., In re Cass & Daley Shoe Co., 11 F.2d 872 (D. Mass. 1926)

(recognizing that creditors' committees "may be of great assistance" in some cases if

"openly and honestly organized and conducted"); Parker v. New England Oil Corp., 8
F.2d 392 (D. Mass. 1925) (committee could act as a fiduciary for creditors if properly
constituted); see also 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY, 44.21[1] (14th ed. 1978);
DeNatale, supra note 2, at 43-44 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1937)); cf In re E.T. Kenney & Co., 136 F. 451, 453 (D. Ind. 1905) (holding that
committees of creditors representing particular creditor interests, rather than "the interest
of general creditors," are "clearly against public policy").
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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cases in which the debtor received an extension of time to pay its debts.'
In 1934 Congress further extended its formal recognition of creditors'
committees to Chapter IX cases involving "public debtors" such as
municipalities and local taxing districts.6
The Chandler Act in 1938 marked the first formal authorization for
creditors to establish committees in the vast majority of cases brought under
the Bankruptcy Act, although it did not require them to do so. In particular,
the Chandler Act gave creditors the authority to select committees and
empowered these committees to "consult and advise with the trustee in
connection with the administration of the estate, make recommendations to
the trustee in the performance of his duties and submit to the court any
question affecting the administration of the estate." I Creditors' committees
that assisted in the administration of the estate or participated in the
development of, or opposition to, a plan in many cases could also petition
the court for monetary reimbursement from the estate for their expenses,
including the cost of employing professionals. 9 Nevertheless, under the

5. See Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 74(h), 47 Stat. 1467, 1469 (repealed 1978
by Bankruptcy Reform Act). Additionally, in cases involving debtor-farmers, the 1933
amendments specifically provided for the appointment of a creditors' committee to assist
in taking an inventory of the debtor's assets. Id. § 75(f), 47 Stat. at 1471 (expired March
1, 1949 pursuant to Act of April 21, 1948, ch. 225, § 75(c), 62 Stat. 198).
6. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 345, § 80(b), 48 Stat. 798, 799 (held unconstitutional
in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936)).
7. Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (hereinafter the "Chandler Act") (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976)) (repealed 1978 by Bankruptcy Reform Act).
8. Chandler Act § 44(b), 52 Stat. at 860 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 72(b)
(1976)) (repealed 1978 by Bankruptcy Reform Act); see also Chandler Act § 209, 52
Stat. at 895 (applicable in Chapter X cases) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 609
(1976)) (repealed 1978 by Bankruptcy Reform Act); Chandler Act § 338, 52 Stat. at 909
(applicable in Chapter XI cases) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 738 (1976))
(repealed 1978 by Bankruptcy Reform Act); Chandler Act § 456, 52 Stat. at 921
(applicable in Chapter XII cases) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 856 (1976))
(repealed 1978 by Bankruptcy Reform Act).
9. See Chandler Act §§ 241-242, 52 Stat. at 900 (applicable in Chapter X cases)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 641-642 (1976)) (repealed 1978 by Bankruptcy
Reform Act); Chandler Act § 491, 52 Stat. at 925 (applicable in Chapter XII cases)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 891 (1976)) (repealed 1978 by Bankruptcy Reform
Act). In "straight" bankruptcies and rehabilitations under Chapter XI, creditors'
committees could obtain a priority claim for costs and expenses incurred in successfully
defeating confirmation of an arrangement or in preventing the debtor's discharge. See
Chandler Act § 64, 52 Stat. at 874 (establishing procedures for compensating committee
professionals and for reimbursement of committee expenses) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 104 (1976)) (repealed 1978 by Bankruptcy Reform Act); Bankr. R. 11-29(c)
(same) (superseded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075); Bankr. R. 12-28(b) (same)
(superseded).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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Bankruptcy Act creditors' committees remained the exception rather than the
rule, because their creation and ability to participate in the bankruptcy
process depended on the initiative of often unorganized and unsophisticated
creditor bodies.'o
B. Committees Under the Bankruptcy Code
Due to the sweeping changes to the bankruptcy laws enacted through
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the role of creditors' committees,
particularly in Chapter 11 cases, has increased dramatically during the past
decade and a half. This increase is due in large part to the apparent
mandatory appointment of a creditors' committee in a Chapter 11 case,
although, as discussed further herein, in practice such appointment does not
always occur.1 Section 1102(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, "As
soon as practicable after the order for relief under Chapter 11 of this title,
the United States trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding
unsecured claims .
"12
Once appointed, a Chapter 11 creditors' committee possesses broad
authority under Bankruptcy Code section 1103(c) both to promote and to
protect the interests of its unsecured creditor constituency. In this regard,
section 1103(c) provides that a duly-appointed committee may:
(1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the
administration of the case;
(2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial

10. See Blain & O'Gawa, supra note 2, at 581 n.1 (noting that, at least under

Chapter XI, "creditors' committees played a very limited role"). The exception involved
cases where attorneys, receivers, and credit agencies solicited proxies in connection with

the formation of creditors' committees and the selection of committee counsel. In
response to widespread criticism of this practice, former Bankruptcy Rule 208 was

promulgated to prohibit anyone other than a creditor of the estate from soliciting proxies;
the rule specifically barred solicitations by attorneys and collection agencies. See, e.g.,

In re Darland Co., 184 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Iowa 1960). Former Rule 208 has been
adopted in large part by Rule 2006 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which

restricts the solicitation of proxies in Chapter 7 cases. However, proxy solicitations are
generally not an issue in Chapter 11 cases because creditors do not vote on committee
appointments. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. Furthermore, proxies have

never been authorized in connection with the voting on a plan of reorganization. See
R. BANKR. P. 2006 advisory committee's note.
11. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988); see also id. § 901 (incorporating § 1102 into
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code). Unless otherwise expressly noted herein, all
provisions of Title 11 relating to the appointment and specific responsibilities of
creditors' committees apply to cases commenced under both Chapters 9 and 11.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the
desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter
relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan;
(3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those represented
by such committee of such committee's determinations as to any plan
formulated, and collect and file with the court acceptances or rejections
of a plan;
(4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner under section
1104 of [title 11] ... ; and
(5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those
represented.13

In order to carry out these functions, a creditors' committee appointed
pursuant to section 1102 may employ professionals,1 4 "may raise and may
appear and be heard on any issue" in the case, 5 and may "transact such
business as may be necessary and proper" with the trustee or debtor in
possession. 6 The Parts of this Article that follow set forth in greater detail
the law regarding committee membership, operations, and responsibilities.
III. FORMATION OF CREDITORS' COMMITTEES

A. Appointment of Committees
1. Time for and Method of Appointment
The authority to appoint a creditors' committee in Chapter 11 cases
rests principally with the U.S. Trustee. This is a relatively recent development because under the Bankruptcy Act creditors' committees were selected
by the creditors themselves. 7 When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy

13. Id. § 1103(c); see infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a); see infra notes 184-191 and accompanying text.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). But see infra notes 192-207 and accompanying text.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(d). Although a Chapter 7 committee is far more limited in its
responsibilities, it may, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 705(b), consult with and make
recommendations to the Chapter 7 trustee and the Office of the United States Trustee
(hereinafter "U.S. Trustee") with respect to the administration of the estate, and submit
to the court or the U.S. Trustee "any question affecting the administration of the estate."
Id. § 705(b). Section 705(b) is in many respects a carryover from § 44(b) of the
Chandler Act. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
17. Under the Bankruptcy Act, any committee representing the interests of more than
one creditor in a Chapter X case needed only to file with the court a document evincing
the committee's authority to act on behalf of certain creditors and a signed statement
setting forth the identity of the committee's members, the nature and amounts of its
members' claims, and the circumstances of its formation. See Bankruptcy Act § 209, 11
U.S.C. § 609 (1976) (repealed 1978); see also Bankr. R. 10-211 (superseded). Similarly,
in a case under Chapter XII, committees could act on behalf of certain creditors

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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Code in 1978, it entrusted the bankruptcy courts in most districts with the
primary authority to appoint creditors' committees in Chapter 11 cases.'6
The only exception existed in those pilot districts where Congress established the U.S. Trustee on an experimental basis. As to those districts, the
U.S. Trustee had authority to appoint Chapter 11 creditors' committees. 19
Although this system was usually adequate, it placed a large administrative burden on the courts and, in some districts, led to lengthy delays in the
appointment of creditors' committees. In addition, the court's appointment
of creditors' committees, as with its selection of private trustees, gave rise
to a question of the court's neutrality in the bankruptcy process when the
court would decide disputes between its hand-picked committee and other
interested parties. With the expansion of the U.S. Trustee program pursuant
to the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986,0 however, these concerns basically became moot.
Pursuant to that legislation, Congress transferred the role of appointing
creditors' committees to the U.S. Trustee for each judicial district in the
United States, except for those in Alabama and North Carolina, where
currently there are no U.S. Trustees. 2'
In most cases, it is important that the U.S. Trustee appoint a creditors'
committee without delay, preferably within the first few weeks after the
filing of the petition. By doing so, the committee can promptly assume its
proper role in the reorganization process. In this regard, Bankruptcy Code
section 1102(a)(1) provides that the U.S. Trustee should appoint a committee "[a]s soon as practicable after the order for relief under Chapter 11 of

following proper authorization and disclosure. See Bankruptcy Act § 456, 11 U.S.C.
§ 856 (1976) (repealed 1978). Finally, in a case under Chapter XI, unsecured creditors

generally were permitted to elect an official creditors' committee of not less than three
but no more than eleven creditors at the meeting of creditors. See Bankruptcy Act § 338,
11 U.S.C. § 738 (1976) (repealed 1978); see also Bankr. R. 11-25 (superseded).
18. Former § 1102(a)(1) provided that "as soon as practicable after the order for
relief under this chapter, the court shall appoint a committee of creditors holding
unsecured claims." 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1982) (amended by Act of Oct. 27, 1986,

Pub. L. No. 99-554, see. 221, § 1102, 100 Stat. 3088, 3101). In Chapter 7 cases,
creditors could continue to select their own committees. See 11 U.S.C. § 705(a) (1988):
At the meeting under section 341(a) of [Title 11], creditors that may vote
for a trustee under section 702(a) of this title may elect a committee of not
fewer than three, and not more than eleven, creditors, each of whom holds
an allowable unsecured claim of a kind entitled to distribution under section
726(a)(2) of this title.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 151102(a) (1982) (repealed 1986).

20. Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 111, 100 Stat. 3088, 3090.
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 581 (1988). But cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(c)(2) & (d) (1988)
(retiree benefits claimholders' committee to be appointed by court).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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this title. "I In voluntary Chapter 11 cases, this requirement often leads to
appointment of committees within a week or two of the commencement of
the case, as the order for relief is entered on the date the petition is filed.'
However, in involuntary Chapter 11 cases and cases commenced under
Chapter 9, the entry of the order for relief may not occur until several
weeks, or even months, after the petition date, thus significantly delaying
a committee's appointment. 24 Even if a committee is formed prior to the
entry of the order for relief, the court may not allow it to employ professionals at the expense of the estate or to otherwise act, at least until such
time as the order for relief is entered. 5
Although not required to do so, the U.S. Trustee typically makes its
committee selections from a list of the twenty largest creditors filed by the
debtor at or near the commencement of the case pursuant to Rule 1007(d)
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.26 As further discussed
below, the U.S. Trustee usually will not want to appoint anyone other than
creditors identified on this list, as the statutory provisions governing
committee appointments favor selections from among the largest unsecured
creditors.
An interesting question arises when the U.S. Trustee fails to appoint a
creditors' committee, or unduly delays in so doing. For example, the U.S.
Trustee in a particular case might believe the appointment of a creditors'
committee (and the committee's subsequent retention of professionals) would
constitute an unnecessary expense to the estate. This could occur where
unsecured debt is combined and the principal controversy is between the
debtor and secured creditor. Single-asset real estate cases are frequently of
this kind. Additionally, the U.S. Trustee might find that the committee
would be unable to retain counsel or other necessary professionals due to a
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
23. See id. § 301.
24. See id. §§ 303(h), 921(d).
25. See In re Colorado Centre Metro. Dist., 113 B.R. 25 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990)
(holding that an official bondholders committee as appointed by the U.S. Trustee cannot
be formed until after an order for relief has been entered).
26. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(d) (providing that Chapter 9 or 11 debtors "shall
file with the petition a list containing the name, address and claim of the creditors that
hold the 20 largest unsecured claims, excluding insiders"; in involuntary Chapter 11
cases, the list shall be filed "within 2 days after entry of the order for relief'); see also
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(d) advisory committee's note (implying that the list should be
used in selecting creditors' committee under Bankruptcy Code § 1102). Query what
remedies are available when the debtor inadvertently (or intentionally) fails to identify
a large creditor on the list, and, as a result, the U.S. Trustee fails to appoint such
creditor to the official creditors' committee. C. infra note 68 (discussing the propriety
of including insiders on a committee, even though insiders should not be included on the
Rule 1007(d) list of 20 largest unsecured creditors).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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lack of funds in the estate. While these concerns might be justified as a
matter of policy in some cases, the Bankruptcy Code does not support the
U.S. Trustee's failure to appoint a committee if eligible creditors are willing
to serve. The plain language of section 1102(a)(1) suggests that in all cases
under Chapter 11, the prompt appointment of at least one creditors'
committee is mandatory,2 7 and the courts and commentators appear
generally to support this view. 8 Furthermore, the concept of a debtor in
possession is premised largely on the existence of an opposing force-the
creditors' committee-capable of assuming many of the watchdog functions
that would otherwise be performed by a trustee.29 Of course, the U.S.
Trustee may be unable to find eligible persons willing to serve on the
committee, particularly in small cases with few creditors or unencumbered
assets. The U.S. Trustee might decide appropriately not to appoint a
committee in such cases.3 0
If the U.S. Trustee is unwilling or unable to appoint a committee, the
burden falls on each individual creditor, the U.S. Trustee, and the court to
ensure that the debtor in possession complies with applicable laws and acts
in the best interests of the estate. It is unclear whether the lack of a
creditors' committee may constitute "cause" for the appointment of a
trustee, 3 although it would seem unfair to penalize the debtor in this
manner simply because no creditors are interested in serving on a committee.

27. Section 1102(a) provides, inter alia, that "the United States trustee shall appoint
a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims." 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (emphasis
added).
28. See, e.g., 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1102.1[3], at 1102-11 (Lawrence P.
King, ed., 15th ed. 1993); In re Texaco Inc., 79 B.R. 560, 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)
("The appointment of one committee of creditors holding unsecured claims against a
Chapter 11 debtor is mandated under 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) if there are creditors
willing to serve.").
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 235-36 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6194-95.
30. See In re Lion Capital Group, 44 B.R. 684, 686 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating

that U.S. Trustee was unable to form an official committee due to small amount of debt
owed to unsecured creditors). Some U.S. Trustees will not appoint a committee unless

they can find three or more unsecured creditors willing to become committee members.
Although neither the Bankruptcy Code nor its legislative history dictates a minimum (or
maximum) size for a Chapter 11 committee, a committee "ordinarily" shall consist of

seven members. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. No court has decided (at
least in a published opinion) whether a committee may consist of only one creditor.
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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2. Committee Membership
Section 1102(b)(1) provides that a committee "shall ordinarily consist"
of members who meet four general standards. Generally, committee
members: (1) consist of the seven largest unsecured creditors of the debtor,
(2) are "persons" as defined by the Bankruptcy Code, (3) hold unsecured
"claims" against the debtor, and (4) are "representative" of the body of
unsecured creditors. 32 Because section 1102(b)(1) is prefaced with the word
"ordinarily," the section appears to set guidelines that presumably need not
be followed in every case. Some legislative history to the section supports
this view, 33describing section 1102(b)(1) as "precatory" and
"nonbinding." In spite of the plain language and legislative history,
however, most courts have interpreted three of the four standards in section
1102(b)(1) as mandatory requirements, holding that only the provision
favoring the appointment of the seven largest creditors is permissive.3 1 No
textual authority provides a basis for treating certain provisions of section
1102(b)(1) as mandatory and others as permissive. Nevertheless, such
treatment is now well established in numerous cases interpreting the section
and, as discussed below, appears to balance competing objectives with
respect to committee appointments.

32. Specifically, § 1102(b)(1) provides, "A committee of creditors appointed under
subsection (a) of this section shall ordinarily consist of persons, willing to serve, that
hold the seven largest claims against the debtor of the kinds represented on such
committee .

. . ."

11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1).

33. SeeH.R. REP. No.595, supranote29,at 401, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6357 ("Subsection (b) [of § 1102] contains precatory language directing the
[appointment of] the persons holding the seven largest claims against the debtor. ...");
see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, 1102.0113] (noting that "the
language of section 1102(b)(1) is precatory"). But see H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note
29, at 401, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6357 (under § 1102(b), "[tlhe court is
restrictedto the appointment of persons.") (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., In re Altair Airlines, 727 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that person
must have "claim" against estate in order to serve on committee); In re Gates Eng'g Co.,
104 B.R. 653, 654 (Bankr. D. Del. 1989) (holding that state agency is not "person"
eligible to serve on committee); In re VTN, Inc., 65 B.R. 278, 279 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1986) (holding committee member must be a "person" as defined under the Code); In
re Bennett, 17 B.R. 819, 820 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982) (holding that to be member of
unsecured creditors' committee, creditor must hold an unsecured claim). But see Van
Arsdale v. Clemo (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 65 B.R. 160, 163 (E.D. Va. 1986) (stating
that § 1102(b)(1) does not "impose mandatory requirements on committee composition"),
aff'd 825 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1987); In re Lion Capital Group, 44 B.R. at 685 (provision
that "persons" sit on committee is "not an absolute bar").
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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a. Size of Committee and Amount of Members' Claims
As noted, the only discretionary provision in section 1102(b)(1)
suggests guidelines for the size of the committee and the amount of its
member's claims. Although a committee "shall ordinarily" consist of the
estate's seven largest unsecured creditors, the courts and U.S. Trustees
routinely adjust the size of creditors' committees. Creditors other than the
seven largest may be selected in order to accommodate competing interests,
or to reflect the size of the case or the number of creditors willing to serve.
It is possible, particularly in large cases with multiple levels of subordinated
debt, that more than seven members may be necessary in order to make a
creditors' committee truly representative of various creditor interests." On
the other hand, the U.S. Trustee may not find seven unsecured creditors
willing to serve on a committee who could properly represent the interests
of all of the committee's constituents.36 In addition, the U.S. Trustee may
choose to exclude one or more of the seven largest unsecured creditors in
order to provide better balance on the committee, particularly when there
are no representatives of the trade among the seven largest unsecured
creditors.3 7
b. "Persons"
The first mandatory requirement of section 1102(b)(1) is that a
committee consist of "persons."38 The Bankruptcy Code defines "person"
as including an "individual, partnership, and corporation." 39 Thus, as a

35. Recently, for example, the U.S. Trustee for the Southern District of New York
appointed a creditors' committee comprised of nineteen members in the Orion Pictures
Chapter 11 case. No. 91-B-15635 (BRL) (S.D.N.Y.).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1). Indeed, as noted supranote 30, it is not at all clear that
there cannot be a committee consisting of a single creditor, although one might challenge
its representativeness if there were many creditors in the unsecured class. Cf.id.§ 705(a)

(mandating that creditors' committees in Chapter 7 cases be comprised of between three
and eleven members).
37. See In re A.H. Robins, 65 B.R. at 163 (approving committee consisting of five
members); In re Featherworks Corp., 25 B.R. 634, 644 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)

(creditor does not have right to serve on committee simply because it is one of the
debtor's seven largest unsecured creditors), aff'd, 36 B.R. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
38. But see Lion Capital Group, 44 B.R. at 685.
39. Section 101(41) provides that the definition of "person" includes:
individual, partnership, and corporation, but does not include governmental
unit, Provided, however, That any governmental unit that acquires an asset
from a person as a result of operation of a loan guarantee agreement, or as
receiver or liquidating agent of a person, will be considered a person for
purposes of section 1102 of [Title 11].
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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general rule, almost any private entity that otherwise meets the qualifications
for service on a creditors' committee may so serve if appointed. However,
because the definition of "person" generally does not include a "governmental unit" such as a state or federal agency, public entities-including taxing
authorities, regulatory agencies, and public utilities-typically are denied
committee positions even though otherwise qualified. 4' The rule against
governmental units sitting on official committees applies even when the
governmental unit is acting in a manner akin to a private creditor, 4 or
when the governmental unit is acting as a trustee for private creditors. 42
The sole exception to the rule that governmental units may not be
members of an official creditors' committee is that a governmental
entity-typically the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter
"FDIC") or the Resolution Trust Corporation (hereinafter "RTC")-may sit
on a committee when it acquires a creditor position from a failed financial
institution. As part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, a3 Congress responded to governmental lobbying pressure by
amending the Code's definition of "person" in section 101(41) to include the
following: "[A]ny governmental unit that acquires an asset from a person as

11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (Supp. IV 1992).
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27), (41) (Supp. IV 1992). Section 101(27) of the
Bankruptcy Code defines a "governmental unit" as:
United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign
state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not a
United States trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this title), a
State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign
state; or other foreign or domestic government.
11 U.S.C. § 101(27); see In re Gates Eng'g, 104 B.R. 653, 654 (Bankr. D. Del. 1989)
(state agency precluded from committee membership); In re VTN, 65 B.R. 278, 279-80
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986) (public service district not "person" eligible to serve on
committee); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 38 B.R. 802, 806 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984)
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation not eligible for committee membership); In re
American Atomics Corp., 2 B.R. 526, 527 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1980) (school district not
"person" eligible to serve on committee); see also H.R. RP. No. 595, supra note 1004,
at 401, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6357 ("The court is restricted to the
appointment of persons in order to exclude governmental holders of claims or
interests.").
41. See In re Gates Eng'g, 104 B.R. at 654 (state agency deemed to have "the same
interest as other members of the Committee" nevertheless precluded from committee
membership); In re VTN, 65 B.R. at 279-80 (holding that merely because private
corporation could have been hired to operate sewage treatment plant did not render
public service district "person" eligible to sit on committee).
42. See Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re
Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.), 39 B.R. 974, 976 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (holding Pension
Benefit Guarantee Corporation not "person" entitled to sit on committee).
43. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
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a result of operation of a loan guarantee agreement, or as receiver or
liquidating agent of a person, will be considered a person for purposes of
section 1102 of [Title 11]." 44 The purpose of this amendment was to
overrule cases such as In re Baldwin-United Corp. 5 that had prevented the
FDIC's membership on committees. The amendment clearly includes the
FDIC or RTC in their capacity as receiver of an insolvent financial
institution. It is less clear, however, whether the amendment permits the
FDIC or RTC to sit on a creditors' committee when those agencies are
acting in their corporate capacities, typically following a purchase of assets
from themselves in their capacities as receivers. Also unclear is whether
other state and federal governmental units, such as the federal Small
Business Administration, may take advantage of this provision when they
become creditors due to their guarantees of bad loans, although the plain.
language of section 101(41) seems to suggest as much.
Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code suggests that a governmental unit is
prohibited from serving on an official creditors' committee as a nonvoting
member. However, no consensus exists on this issue.46 There also does not
appear to be any reason why a governmental unit cannot serve on an
additional creditors' committee established pursuant to section 1102(a)(2),
but a governmental unit cannot serve on an initial equity holders' committee
whose membership arguably is restricted to "persons" by section 1102

(b). 47
c. "Claim"
(1) Generally
The courts have interpreted section 1102(b)(1) as requiring the U.S.

44. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (Supp. IV 1992).
45. 38 B.R. 802 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
46. CompareIn re Gates Eng'g, 104 B.R. at 654 (allowing governmental agency to
serve on committee as nonvoting member), with Baldwin-United Corp., 38 B.R. at 806
(holding governmental unit could not even serve as a nonvoting member of official

committee). Sometimes nonvoting members are incorrectly called "ex-officio" members.
47. As discussed infra, § 1102(a)(2) authorizes the appointment of additional
committees of creditors or equity security holders. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (1988).

Although § 1102(b)(1) sets forth the requirements for appointment on an official
creditors' committees pursuant to § 1102(a)(1), and § 1102(b)(2) sets forth similar
requirements for equity committees, whether by Congressional intent or oversight there
is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that sets forth requirements for membership on an
additional creditors' committee appointed pursuant to § 1102(a)(2). See In re Lion Capital
Group, 44 B.R. 684, 685-86 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (when U.S. Trustee was unable
to appoint official committee, governmental creditors were appointed to special
committee).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10

14

Klee and Shaffer: Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code

1993]

CREDITORS' COMMITEES

1009

Trustee to appoint to an official creditors' committee only those persons who
have unsecured "claims" against the estate or, in some cases, their duly
authorized representatives. This requirement generally causes little
controversy given the broad definition of "claim" under the Code.48 The
U.S. Trustee thus may appoint an unsecured creditor even though that
creditor's claim against the estate is contingent, disputed, unmatured, or
unliquidated.4 9 Any other rule would allow a debtor to control membership
of a creditors' committee simply by selectively objecting to claims or by
scheduling them as disputed.5"
(2) Representatives or Agents of Creditors
In certain districts, creditors' committees are commonly comprised not
of actual creditors, but rather of their representatives or agents, typically
attorneys, financial advisors, and indenture trustees.5 1 While the Code does

48. Section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "claim" as a:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (Supp. IV 1992).
It is unclear whether a creditor who holds an undersecured, nonrecourse debt may
be appointed to a creditors' committee. See id. § 1111(b)(1)(A) (1988) (providing that,
unless the claim holder elects otherwise, a claim secured by a lien on property of the
estate generally "shall be allowed or disallowed ...

the same as if the holder of such

claim had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such
holder has such recourse."); see also id. § 102(2) ("'[C]laim against the debtor' includes
claim against property of the debtor."). If § 1111(b)(1)(A) gives an undersecuredcreditor
recourse against the debtor, then the creditor would seem to satisfy the requirement of
§ 1102(b)(1) that it have a "claim" against the debtor. On the other hand, after Dewsnup
v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992), those courts that do not allow lien stripping, e.g. Taffi
v. United States (In re Taffi), 144 B.R. 105 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992), may also not
allow an undersecured creditor to sit on a committee. In our view, however, Dewsnup
only applies in Chapter 7 cases and, thus, should not mandate this result.
49. See In re Laclede Cab Co., 145 B.R. 308, 309 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992); In re
Microboard Processing, Inc., 95 B.R. 283 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); In re Richmond
Tank Car Co., 93 B.R. 504, 506 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988); In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
57 B.R. 680, 687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Churchill Coal Corp., 31 B.R. 115
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Daig Corp., 17 B.R. 41, 43 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); In
re Grynberg, 10 B.R. 256 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).
50. See In re Microboard Processing, 95 B.R. at 285.
51. See, e.g., In re First RepublicBank Corp., 95 B.R. 58, 60 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
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not expressly prohibit the appointment of representatives or agents of
creditors who are not themselves creditors, such practice arguably conflicts
with the requirement that committee members be unsecured creditors of the
estate. The Code defines "creditor" and "claim" very broadly, 2 but those
definitions do not appear to include the representatives or agents of claim
holders who are not themselves creditors. This exclusion may be contrasted
with section 1(11) of the Bankruptcy Act, which expressly provided that the
term "'creditor' shall include anyone who owns a debt demand, or claim
provable in bankruptcy, and may include his duly authorized agent,
attorney, orproxy. "5
Although the Code's definitions of "creditor" and "claim" suggest that
only actual creditors, and not their representatives and agents, may sit on a
creditors' committee, cases have permitted noncreditor membership by
numerous types of representatives, including: (1) attorneys; 4 (2) indenture
trustees;55 and (3) unions representing their employees,56 particularly
when the union itself also is deemed to have independent claims against the
estate.5 7 Nevertheless, even though a court or U.S. Trustee may find that

1988) ("The committee can include the individual creditor or its representative."); In re
M.H. Corp., 30 B.R. 266, 267 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that attorney of
creditor authorized to serve on committee).
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (Supp. IV 1992) (defining "creditor"); see also supra
note 48 (quoting Code section that defines "claim").
53. 11 U.S.C. § 1(11) (1976) (repealed 1978) (emphasis added).
54. See In re M.H. Corp., 30 B.R. at 267 (holding that attorney may be appointed
as representative of single creditor, but not of class of creditors). But see In re Celotex
Corp., 123 B.R. 917, 922-23 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that counsel could not
serve on committee without holding claim against the estate); In re American Fed'n of
Television & Radio Artists, 30 B.R. 772 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same).
55. See In re McLean Indus., 70 B.R. 852, 862 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that
indenture trustees often serve on creditors' committees); In re Charter Co., 42 B.R. 251
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (permitting indenture trustee to serve on committee). But see
In re Public Serv. Co., 89 B.R. 1014, 1019 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (noting, without
resolving, the "building conflict as to whether indenture trustees may or should
appropriately be members of creditors' committees in chapter 11 proceedings").
Typically indenture trustees will have their own claim against the debtor for fees and
charges under the indenture.
56. See In re Schatz Fed. Bearings Co., 5 B.R. 543 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). Note
that the union in Schatz FederalBearings subsequently sought, and was granted, leave
to withdraw from membership on the committee. See In re Schatz Fed. Bearings Co.,.
11 B.R. 363 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
57. See In re Altair Airlines, 727 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Chateaugay Corp.,
104 B.R. 626, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Enduro Stainless, Inc., 59 B.R. 603 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1986); In re National Equip. & Mold Corp., 33 B.R. 574 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1983). But see In re Allied Delivery Sys. Co., 52 B.R. 85 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)
(union denied seat on creditors' committee when it failed to show that creditors'
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a representative or agent of a claim holder satisfies the "creditor" requirement in section 1102, such a representative or agent may be disqualified
from serving on a creditors' committee due to the agent's conflicting
loyalties to his or her own client's particular interests and to the constituency of the creditors' committee as a whole." As a practical matter, there
may be merit in restricting committee membership to business persons with
a direct economic stake in the outcome of the case, because such persons
often would be the best suited to make economic decisions and to participate
in the deliberative process. Business persons also could be less likely to
prolong the case in an effort to run up fees.5 9
d. A "Representative" Committee
(1) Generally
The final requirement under section 1102(b)(1) is that an official
creditors' committee be "representative" of the class of creditors the
committee is entrusted to represent. Courts have derived the "representative" requirement not only from section 1102(b)(1) itself, which authorizes
the continuation of prepetition creditors' committees that are "representative
of the different kinds of claims to be represented," but also from section
1102(a)(2), which authorizes the appointment of additional committees "to
assure adequate representation of creditors or of equity security holders."'
Whether a creditors' committee is sufficiently "representative" cannot be
determined by application of any empirical formula. Rather, the courts pay
close attention to the particular facts at hand, and they consider the issue on
a case-by-case basis.
Courts generally require only that a creditors' committee be representative of the unsecured creditors whose interests it is charged with protecting;
a committee need not be representative of secured creditors and equity
security holders of the estate. In addition, although, as discussed below,

committee was unrepresentative of general unsecured creditors and where an adversarial
relationship existed between the union and the debtor).
58. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
59. See In re M.H. Corp., 30 B.R. at 267. The court in M.H. Corp. noted:
[ ]ith respect to service of attorneys on creditors committees, it is our policy
to encourage creditors to designate persons engaged in their businesses to
serve on a creditors committee, our thought being that such persons have
greater insight into business affairs and this will be more useful in fulfilling
the function of a creditors committee. We do not, however, bar the service
on a creditors committee of an attorney if a creditor, aware of the just stated
policy suggestion of the court, wishes that such a person be its representative.

Id.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (1988).
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each member of a committee represents the interests of constituent
unsecured creditors generally, each member need not hold a claim of a kind
that is representative of every such creditor, so long as the member's claim
can be fairly placed within the constituent class. As one court recently has
held, the official creditors' committee need not "faithfully reproduce the
exact complexion of the creditor body." 6' Thus, for example, if bank
creditors and trade creditors can fairly represent the interests of unsecured
creditors generally, the U.S. Trustee could well decide not to appoint tort
claimants or warranty claimants where their claims are relatively small or
are likely to be treated as not impaired under a plan.
In In re MicroboardProcessingInc. ,62 the court found no violation of
section 1102 when two of the committee's members were the only two
nonvendor creditors of the estate. To the contrary, the court reasoned that,
without representatives of nonvendor creditors, the creditors' committee
might not satisfy the representativeness requirements of section 1102.63
Likewise, in In re American Federation of Television & Radio
Artists,' the court held that a creditor holding approximately ninety-eight
percent of unsecured claims in a case may sit on a creditors' committee, at
least absent any showing of an actual conflict of interest with other
creditors. Therefore, while the U.S. Trustee might be wise to avoid
appointing persons whose claims are so unique as to create conflicts with
other creditors' interests, such as insiders and partially secured creditors, the
U.S. Trustee has wide latitude in determining which creditors are best suited
for committee membership.
(2) Conflicts of Interest
Even though a creditor's claims otherwise may be representative of
those of other unsecured creditors, the U.S. Trustee must not appoint that
creditor to an official creditors' committee if an actual conflict of interest
exists between that creditor and other unsecured claim holders. Arguably,
in many cases every unsecured creditor has a potential conflict of interest
with the debtor and other persons asserting claims against the estate, because
in anything other than a one hundred-cent case, the existence of any
particular creditor usually reduces the amount available for distribution to

61. In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); see In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 118 B.R. 209 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that

when considering representativeness of committee, court should consider not the
uniqueness of claims, but rather how they will be treated under a plan).
62. 95 B.R. 283 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989).

63. Id. at 286.
64. 30 B.R. 772 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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other unsecured creditors.' Of course, such a potential conflict cannot be
sufficient to bar a creditor from membership on an official creditors'
committee, or there would be no such committees in many cases. For this
reason, courts generally will ignore speculative or contingent conflicts and
concern themselves only with actual ones instead.
Unfortunately, little case law exists to explain what constitutes an
impermissible "actual" conflict of interest. According to one court, an actual
conflict arises when a member has breached, or is likely to breach, a
fiduciary duty to the committee's constituents.' Under this view, a conflict
is measured not by reference to a creditor's status, but rather to the
creditor's conduct during the course of the case. However, most courts
consider both status and conduct, examining both the pre-existing relationship between the creditor and the estate and any actions that the creditor
may take with respect to the same. Until the standards governing impermissible conflicts become better developed, the U.S. Trustee might be well
advised to avoid appointing a creditor with any significant potential conflict,
if at all possible. Moreover, even though a creditor may not be barred
legally from serving on a committee due to a conflict, a creditor with a
serious potential conflict should think twice before becoming a committee
member. Otherwise, the creditor might ultimately hinder both the committee's ability to represent the interests of its constituents and the creditor's
ability to protect its own interests.
The following paragraphs illustrate situations that may create actual
conflicts involving creditors' committee membership. It should be noted,
however, that courts generally determine conflicts on a case-by-case basis
after close examination of the particular facts at hand. With few exceptions
noted below, courts rarely establish per se rules against particular types of
creditors serving on committees because of conflict of interest concerns.
(a)Insiders
The most obvious example of a potential conflict of interest that may
rise to the level of an impermissible actual conflict involves the appointment
of insiders of the debtor to a committee. The term "insider" as used in the
Code includes directors, officers, partners, and affiliates of the debtor, as
well as relatives of an individual debtor and relatives of directors and
officers of a corporate debtor.67 In most cases, the U.S. Trustee will not
65. See In re Microboard Processing, 95 B.R. at 285.
66. Id.; see also In re Laclede Cab, 145 B.R. 308, 309 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992); In
re Map Int'l, Inc., 105 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating that a competitor of
the debtor may serve on committee as long as competitor does not violate fiduciary duties
to creditors); Blain & O'Gawa, supra note 2, at 588.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (Supp. IV 1992). An "affiliate" under the B ankruptcy Code
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appoint insiders to a committee for the simple reason that they are required
to be excluded from the debtor's list of the twenty largest creditors upon
which the U.S. Trustee typically relies in making committee appointments. 8 Nevertheless, the U.S. Trustee does on occasion appoint insiders,
either by choice or inadvertence. While the better practice would appear to
be that insiders should never be permitted to serve on committees, 69 a
number of courts allow insiders and former insiders to serve on creditors'
committees absent a showing of actual conflict.7"
(b)
Representatives or Agents of Creditors
As discussed previously, although creditors' committees generally are
comprised of the estate's largest unsecured creditors, a number of courts
express their (sometimes reluctant) approval of the appointment of
representatives or agents of actual creditors, even though the representatives

generally includes an "entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with

power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor", a
subsidiary corporation of which the debtor owns or controls more than 20% of the
outstanding voting securities, persons who lease substantially all of their assets to the
debtor, and entities who operate substantially all of the debtor's business or property. Id.
§ 101(2).
68. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(d) (providing that the list of 20 largest creditors
shall "exclud[e] insiders"); see also supra note 26. Query whether Rule 1007(d) is
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code in that the latter does not prohibit the appointment
of insiders to a creditors' committee. Perhaps the better rule would be to require the
debtor to list the names and identities of both insiders and noninsiders so that the U.S.
Trustee may decide whether to appoint an insider to the committee.
69. See In re Swolsky, 55 B.R. 144 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (holding that presence
on committee of member, whose wife was Chapter 11 debtor's office manager,
bookkeeper, and vice-president, presented inherent conflict of interest and thus member
could not serve on committee); In re Glendale Woods Apartments, Ltd., 25 B.R. 414
(Bankr. D. Md. 1982) (removing insider from committee due to concerns of confidentiality); In re Daig Corp., 17 B.R. 41 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (holding that relative of
principal operating officer of debtor not allowed to serve on committee).
70. See, e.g., Skulsky v. Nyack Autopartstores Holding Co. (In re Nyack
Autopartstores Holding Co.), 98 B.R. 659, 661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that
cousin of debtors' principal operating officer was not barred from committee membership); In re First RepublicBank Corp., 95 B.R. 58, 61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) ("The
Bankruptcy Code does not expressly prohibit a person from serving on a committee
because of a lack of disinterestedness or even insider status."); In re Vermont Real Estate
Inv. Trust, 20 B.R. 33 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) (holding that wife of former president and
executive manager of debtor could serve on committee, even though husband was
defendant in suit brought by debtor, but could not participate in any committee decisions
relating to suit against husband).
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or agents themselves do not have claims against the estate. 1 Typically, the
representative members are attorneys or indenture trustees, but they could
also include anyone ranging from union representatives to financial advisors.
Even though a court may deem a representative or agent to satisfy the claimholder requirement of section 1102, many courts have expressed concern
that such a person's participation on a creditors' committee may lead to
serious conflict of interest problems.72 Such problems may arise because
the representative or agent member must balance his or her fiduciary duties
to the committee's entire constituency against the duties owed to the
individual or class of creditors that the member represents.
The court in In re Celotex Corp.73 best expressed the concern for this
type of potential conflict in its holding that it is improper for an attorney
employed by certain creditors to represent those same creditors' interests on
a committee:
Because in this case committee participation is not by the appointed
members but by their legal representatives, an anomaly arises. Each
legal representative who sits on the committee has a fiduciary duty to its
own client/member as well as a fiduciary duty to the committee and
each of its constituents .... From this perspective, this Court can
observe a potential conflict on the part of those attorneys who sit on the
[creditors' committee] as between their client, the committee, [and] its
members .... These legal representatives have different fiduciary
duties to their individual clients as distinct from that owed to the
constituency of the committee. 74
Other courts take the position that a creditor representing a special
constituency may serve on the committee because the member has only "one
vote" and, thus, arguably would be outvoted when acting in its own selfinterest.75 For example, in In re Schatz Federal Bearings Co. ,76 a credi71. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1043 (3d Cir. 1985) (questioning
counsel's representation of class of potential asbestos victims when counsel "formerly
aligned with the Creditors' Committee"); Locks v. United States Trustee, 157 B.R. 89,
93-94 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
73. 123 B.R. 917 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
74. Id. at 921-22 (footnote omitted); see also Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Doan
(In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 919 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that a

conflict of interest existed when a member of the creditors' committee also represented
an asbestos litigant in action against the estate), and 36 B.R. 743, 749 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.

N.Y.) (questioning lawyer-members' abilities to represent creditor interests other than
those of their clients), appeal dismissed, 39 B.R. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
75. See infra notes 253-256 and accompanying text.
76. 5 B.R. 543 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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tors' committee opposed a union's motion for appointment to the committee,
contending that there would be a conflict between the fiduciary duty the
union owed to its own membership and the duty it would owe to the creditor
body as a member of the committee. The committee argued that "in an
effort to preserve the estate of the debtor it might be contemplated that
drastic reductions in the work force or total liquidation might be in order,
whereas the Union has a duty to its membership to preserve jobs and
maintain the present operations."' The court refused to deny the union
membership on the committee based on this purported conflict of interest:
As a practical matter, the Union may exercise only one vote as a
member of the Official Creditors' Committee. Therefore, notwithstanding the size of the Union or the amount of its claim, nine other
members of the Committee will have equal standing and weight in
expressing their views with regard to the actions of the Committee as a
whole. 8
Arguably, based on the reasoning of the Schatz court, no conflict of
interest should ever preclude a creditor from committee membership,
because the committee's other members could always overrule the conflicted
member. This clearly is not, and should not be, the prevailing view. In a
close vote, a member whose exercise of fiduciary duty is in question should
not decide the outcome of the committee's vote.
(c) PartiallySecured Creditors
Clearly, secured creditors should not be appointed to the official
unsecured creditor's committee. 79 Nevertheless, while the practice is

77. Id. at 548.

78. Id.; see also In re White Motor Credit Corp., 18 B.R. 720, 722 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1980) (permitting creditors with claims against two separate affiliated debtors to

serve on separate committee for one debtor where committee was structured as to vest
numerical control in creditors with claims against that debtor only); cf. In re Altair
Airlines, 727 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1984) (permitting union to be appointed to general
unsecured creditors' committee); In re Northeast Dairy Coop., 59 B.R. 531,534 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1986) (permitting union and trustees of pension and welfare funds to serve on
unsecured creditors' committee); In re Charter Co., 42 B.R. 251 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1984) (permitting indenture trustee to sit on unsecured creditors' committee).
79. The House Report to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provides:

The bill does not provide for the inclusion of secured creditors on the
committee of unsecured creditors. Because the purpose of a committee is to
represent a class that is too large to speak for itself as a whole, inclusion of

representatives from other classes would present a potential for conflict within
the committee, and the danger of committee action being taken to the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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perhaps questionable, it is generally agreed that partially secured creditors

0
may sit on official creditors' committees.A In In re Walat Farms, Inc.,81

for example, the court justified the appointment of a partially secured
creditor to the committee by stating that "[s]ince the rights of the undersecured creditor to protect or satisfy its unsecured claim are the same as
those of a general unsecured creditor, the undersecured creditor should not
be precluded from participating on the creditors' committee."81 Of course,
if the creditor intends to move for relief from the automatic stay to foreclose
on collateral that is vital to the operation of the business, the creditor should
resign from the creditors' committee, because the creditor's secured position
would likely conflict with the interests of unsecured creditors generally.83
(d) Recipients of FraudulentTransfers and Preferences

As discussed above, the mere fact that one has a dispute with the debtor
regarding the validity of a claim is not in itself sufficient to keep that person
off a creditors' committee. 4 If, however, a high likelihood exists that the
estate may have material avoidance actions against a particular creditor
either for allegedly fraudulent conveyances or for preferences, I itmay be
advisable to bar that creditor from committee membership. In particular,

detriment of the class that it is intended to represent. Secured creditors are
most often in single-member classes, and thus are able to speak for themselves
individually. Nevertheless, the bill continues to permit secured creditors to
serve as non-voting members of the unsecured creditor's committee.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 29, at 236, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6195.
80. See In re Seaescape Cruises, Ltd., 131 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991);
In re Markunes, 86 B.R. 933 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Walat Farms, Inc., 64
B.R. 65, 68-69 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); see also Blain & O'Gawa, supra note 2, at
584 (justifying committee membership by partially secured creditors on the ground that
under § 506(a) a partially secured creditor may divide its claim into secured and
unsecured components; cf supra note 48); In re America W. Airlines, 142 B.R. 901,
903 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992) (upholding U.S. Trustee's decision to remove partially
secured creditors' committee member in part because member would have to make
"difficult" choices between representing its unsecured constituents and forwarding its
own interests); In re Glendale Woods Apartments, 25 B.R. at 415 (finding that partially
secured creditor might have conflict of interest with unsecured claimants).
81. 64 B.R. 65 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
82. Id. at 69.
83. See generally In re America W. Airlines, 142 B.R. at 903 (finding partially
secured creditor to have inherent conflict with unsecured creditors). But see In re
Seaescape Cruises, 131 B.R. at 243 (permitting creditor who unsuccessfully sought relief
from stay to remain on creditors' committee).
84. See supranotes 49-50 and accompanying text.
85. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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that creditor should be barred if it appears likely that the committee may be
required to play a leading role in the litigation.86 Similarly, if litigation
between the estate and the member arises after the appointment of a
particular committee member, the member should, at the least, be recused
from participating in any deliberations regarding that litigation. If the
litigation is significant, the member should consider resigning from the
committee, or be subject to removal.
(e) Competitors, Vendors, and Customers
Under section 1103(c)(2), a creditors' committee may investigate "the
desirability of the continuance of [the debtor's] business."' Competitors
and those who conduct business with the debtor often possess views with
respect to this issue based upon their own relationships with the debtor,
rather than upon an objective view of how to maximize value for unsecured
creditors generally. As the court in In re Tri Manufacturing & Sales Co. 88
recognized, "[i]t is all too clear that a competitor of [the] debtor will have
a different 'predisposition' in evaluating the desirability of the continuance
of [the] debtor's business than will an ordinary creditor."89 A competitor
may push for a liquidation of the debtor's business even though reorganization would maximize distributions to creditors. Similarly, a customer or
supplier may be biased in favor of continued operations even though
unsecured creditors as a whole might be better off with a quick liquidation
of the debtor.
The courts are split regarding whether a competitor of the debtor may
serve on a creditors' committee. The significant concerns include compromising a committee member's duty to promote the general interests of the
creditors' committee's constituents and granting a competitor access to trade
secrets and other confidential information about the debtor. The majority
view appears to be that, absent additional evidence of an actual conflict of
interest, competitors may be appointed to committees; 90 however, the

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See infra notes 194-198 and accompanying text.
11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2) (1988).
51 B.R. 178 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
Id. at 180.
See, e.g., In re Map Int'l, Inc., 105 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding

that until committee member takes action that violates his fiduciary duty to creditors, the
court should not interfere with committee membership upon mere speculation); In re

Plant Specialties, Inc., 59 B.R. 1 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (stating that debtor has burden
of showing how competitor's service on creditors' committee will be detrimental to its
reorganization efforts); see also In re Penn-Dixie Indus., 9 B.R. 936, 940 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981) (member of.equity holders' committee not removed in spite of member's

apparent intention to acquire the debtor).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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contrary view is not without ample support and justification. 9 No reported
decisions have discussed whether a customer or supplier of the debtor should
serve on a committee.

09 Minority Viewpoints
It must be remembered that the creditors' committee is, in fact, a
committee. It is not uncommon for creditors' committee members, as a
group of individual creditors with potentially diverse and conflicting
interests, to differ widely in their opinions regarding the prospects or
desirability of the debtor's reorganization. However, the fact that some
committee members' views may differ from those of the majority of
unsecured creditors is not a ground for excluding such creditors from the
committee. 92
Because creditors' committee members represent the interests of all of
the committee's constituents, often a committee may take positions without
the unanimous support of its members. Indeed, it is not uncommon for
committee members or constituents to take contrary positions to those
expressed by the committee as a whole.9' Committee members may act
individually to protect their own interests notwithstanding a contrary position
of the committee;94 however, committee members should be careful not to
let their divergent views interfere with their duties to the unsecured creditors
when voting on positions the committee intends to take.
Despite the goal of Chapter 11 debtors to consummate a plan of
reorganization, there is no requirement that committee members support the

91. See, e.g., In re Tri Mfg. & Sales Co., 51 B.R. 178 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985)
(disqualifying law firm as representative of creditors' committee where firm was
representing debtor's former general manager who was then employed by debtor's
competitor); In re Wilson Foods Corp., 31 B.R. 272 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (holding
that "significant competitor" should not serve on committee because "[c]onflicting
interests and divided loyalties have no place on a committee of creditors").
92. See In re Plabell Rubber Prods., 140 B.R. 179, 181 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992)
(citing In re Texaco Inc., 79 B.R. 560, 567 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)); In re Public Serv.
Co., 89 B.R. 1014, 1019 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) ("[The existence of strong and diverse
views is not per se a disqualification for service on a creditors' committee in a chapter
11 proceeding.") (citing In re Baldwin-United Corp., 41 B.R. 375, 376 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1983); In re M.H. Corp., 30 B.R. 266, 267 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983)).
93. See In re Central Medical Ctr., Inc., 122 B.R. 568, 570-71 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1990) (bondholders' committee may oppose confirmation of plan notwithstanding
overwhelming vote of its constituents in favor of the plan).
94. E.g., In re American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 30 B.R. 772, 775-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (individual committee member entitled to oppose extension of debtor's
plan exclusivity period, notwithstanding committee's decision not to oppose the
extension).
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debtor's efforts to reorganize or support any particular plan of reorganization.9' Indeed, so long as no other reason exists why a particular committee
member should not serve, "[tihere is nothing in the [Bankruptcy Code]
which would prevent service on the creditors committee of a creditor
unsympathetic to the efforts of a debtor to reorganize."96 While the
committee is entitled to "participate in the formulation of a plan,"' it may
also seek the appointment of a trustee, 9 or conversion of the case to one
under Chapter 7 for the purpose of liquidating the estate.99 Of course, there
are limits as to how obstructionist a committee member may be. A
committee member who engages in unreasonable conduct to impede the
reorganization process or to promote that creditor's own self interests may
(and indeed should) be removed from the committee." °
B. PrepetitionCommittees
1. Functions
Although creditors' committees generally exist within the context of a
case pending under title 11, creditors increasingly are establishing committees before the commencement of a case in order to protect their interests
and to negotiate uniformly with the debtor or other creditors. This process
is particularly evident in cases involving debtors that underwent leveraged
buyouts in the 1980s, resulting in the placement of unsecured or grossly
undersecured "junk bonds" with groups of large institutional creditors. Such
creditors possess the knowledge and resources to form committees without
the assistance of the bankruptcy court and the U.S. Trustee. Also, these
creditors often are able to employ professionals without assurances that the

95. In re Laclede Cab Co., 145 B.R. 308, 309 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992); In re
Seaescape Cruises, Ltd., 131 B.R. at 243; In re Microboard Processing, Inc., 95 B.R.
283, 286 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); In re M.H. Corp., 30 B.R. at 267.
96. In re M.H. Corp., 30 B.R. at 267 (citing In re Schatz Fed. Bearing, 11 B.R. 363
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (1988).
98. Id. §§ 1103(c)(4), 1104(a); see In re Microwave Prods. of Am., Inc., 102 B.R.
666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989) (granting committee's motion to appoint a trustee as an
"extraordinary remedy available to creditors"); In re Russell, 60 B.R. 42 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1985); In re L.S. Good & Co., 8 B.R. 312, 314-15 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1980).
Note, however, that § 1104 is inapplicable in Chapter 9 cases.
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (a "party in interest" may move to have case
converted); id. § 1109(b) (committee may raise and be heard "on any issue in a case");
see also In re W.J. Rewoldt Co., 22 B.R. 459 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (granting
committee's motion to convert case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7); In re Graf Bros., 19
B.R. 269 (Barkr. D. Me. 1982). Section 1112(b) does not apply to Chapter 9 cases.
100. See In re Public Serv. Co., 89 B.R. 1014, 1018-19 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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estate will pay their fees. However, if the prepetition committee's efforts
substantially contribute to the debtor's reorganization, the committee's fees
and expenses may be reimbursed from the estate. 10 ' Moreover, an organized group of creditors may be able to pressure the debtor into financing
the committee's activities, particularly in developing a consensual out-ofcourt reorganization plan.
When forming a prepetition committee, creditors should be careful to
define its constituency. On the one hand, those forming the committee may
want to limit its representation to a particular subset of creditors, such as
bondholders or trade creditors. This allows the committee to limit its
potential liability for breaches of fiduciary duty to creditors as a whole."o
On the other hand, with a broad constituency, the committee may have more
clout in negotiations with the debtor, and it may be more likely to be
appointed to serve as the official committee when, and if, the debtor's
Chapter 11 case is commenced.

101. Section 503(b)(3) provides an administrative priority for:
the actual, necessary expenses, other than compensation and reimbursement
specified in paragraph (4) of this subsection, incurred by (D) a ...

committee representing creditors or equity security holders other

than a committee appointed under section 1102 of [Title 11], in making a
substantial contribution in a case under chapter 9 or 11 of [Title 11].
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3).
Section 503(b)(4) also provides an administrative priority for:
reasonable compensation for professional services rendered by an attorney or
an accountant of an entity whose expense is allowable under paragraph (3) of
this subsection, based on the time, the nature, the extent, and the value of
such services, and the cost of comparable services other than in a case under
[Title 11], and reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses incurred by such
attorney or accountant.
Id. § 503(b)(4).
Pursuant to § 503(b)(3) and (4), it appears that prepetition committees may be
reimbursed for their expenses, and their professionals may be compensated, if the
committees make a "substantial contribution" to the reorganization process. See In re
Medical Gen., Inc., 17 B.R. 13, 14 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (fees allowed when
prepetition services contributed to eventual confirmation of plan); cf. In re Jensen-Farley
Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (denying compensation for
professionals' fees incurred by prepetition committee due to committee's failure to show
it provided any benefit to the estate). In particular, reimbursement may be warranted
when a prepetition committee participates in the development of a "prepackaged" plan
of reorganization, which enables the administrative expenses during the case itself to be
reduced dramatically.
102. See infra notes 234-249 and accompanying text.
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2. Appointment of a Prepetition Committee as the
Official Committee
While official committees ordinarily are selected by the U.S. Trustee
after the commencement of the case, section 1102(b)(1) provides that a
committee may consist of "the members of a committee organized by
creditors before the commencement of the case under this chapter, if such
committee was fairly chosen and is representative of the different kinds of
claims to be represented.""°3 As with the appointment of a new committee,
the U.S. Trustee initially decides if a prepetition committee should continue
to serve during a case. The U.S. Trustee's decision, however, is subject to
extensive judicial review pursuant to the procedures set forth in Rule 2007
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Rule 2007 provides, inter
alia, that upon motion by a party in interest, the court shall determine
whether a prepetition committee adequately represents that committee's
postpetition constituency."~ A court "may" so find if the committee was

103. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1).
104. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2007:
(a) Motion to Review Appointment. If a committee appointed by the
United States trustee pursuant to § 1102(a) of the Code consists of the
members of a committee organized by creditors before the commencement of
a Chapter 9 or Chapter 11 case, on motion of a party in interest and after a
hearing on notice to the United States trustee and other entities as the court
may direct, the court may determine whether the appointment of the
committee satisfies the requirements of § 1102(b)(1) of the Code.

(b) Selection of Members of Committee. The court may find that a
committee organized by unsecured creditors before the commencement of a
Chapter 9 or Chapter 11 case was fairly chosen if:
(1) it was selected by a majority in number and amount of claims of
unsecured creditors who may vote under § 702(a) of the Code and were
present in person or represented at a meeting of which all creditors having
unsecured claims of over $1,000 or the 100 unsecured creditors having the
largest claims had at least five days notice in writing, and of which meeting
written minutes reporting the names of the creditors present or represented
and voting and the amounts of their claims were kept and are available for
inspection;
(2) all proxies voted at the meeting for the elected committee were
solicited pursuant to Rule 2006 and the lists and statements required by
subdivision (e) thereof have been transmitted to the United States trustee; and

(3) the organization of the committee was in all other respects fair and
proper.
(c) Failureto Comply With RequirementsforAppointment. After a hearing
on notice pursuant to subdivision (a) of this rule, the court shall direct the

United States trustee to vacate the appointment of the committee and may
order other appropriate action if the court finds that such appointment failed
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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selected at a meeting for which notice was given to the debtor's 100 largest
unsecured creditors or to all unsecured creditors holding claims greater than
$1,000, if all proxies were solicited in accordance with Rule 2006 of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and if the organization of the
committee was in all other respects fair and proper.
It seems strange that while, as discussed further herein, the U.S.
Trustee generally has broad discretion in appointing a new creditors'
committee postpetition, 1°5 the U.S. Trustee must nonetheless conduct a
searching inquiry into the formation of any prepetition committee that will
continue as the official committee during the course of the case. Unfortunately, no court has yet to apply Rule 2007 in a published opinion, so it is
unclear what effect this anomaly will have. When a court does attempt to
apply Rule 2007, the court will have to consider whether Rule 2007 has any
real effect after the repeal in 1986 of former section 1102(c), which
10 6
provided a means for the judicial challenge of committee appointments.
The court also should consider whether Rule 2007 violates 28 U.S.C.
§ 2075, which requires that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
"shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right."" While the
Bankruptcy Rules often establish notice and other procedural requirements,
Rule 2007 attempts to define substantive terms in the Code regarding the
constitution of a "fairly chosen" committee. After considering these issues,
a court may conclude that the U.S. Trustee's decision to continue a
prepetition committee should not be subject to any more stringent review
than the U.S. Trustee's decision to appoint a new creditors' committee. To
obviate the issue, the U.S. Trustee simply may choose to appoint a new
committee consisting generally of the members of the prepetition committee.

to satisfy the requirement of § 1102(b)(1) of the Code.
It is questionable whether Bankruptcy Code § 105(a) authorizes a court to conduct sua
sponte a hearing pursuant to Rule 2007(c). See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
105. See infra notes 151-164 and accompanying text.
106. Former § 1102(c) provided:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court
may change the membership or the size of a committee appointed under
subsection (a) of this section if the membership of such committee is not
representative of the different kinds of claims or interests to be represented.
11 U.S.C. § 1102(c) (1982) (repealed 1986). But see FED. R. BANKR. P. 2020, which
continues to provide a means for challenging "any act or failure to act by the United
States trustee."
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9030 (providing that the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure "shall not be construed to extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the courts or the venue of any matters therein"); In re Roberts, 68 B.R.
1004, 1006-07 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (finding FD. R. BANKR. P. 4001(b) to be

invalid due to conflict with 11 U.S.C. § 362(e)).
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C. Multiple Committees
1. Generally
While section 1102 generally calls for the appointment of a single
creditors' committee, Congress recognized that, particularly in large cases,
a single committee may not be able to represent adequately the interests of
all unsecured creditors.' Accordingly, section 1102(a)(1) authorizes the
U.S. Trustee to "appoint additional committees of creditors or of equity
security holders as the United States trustee deems appropriate," such as
when more than one distinct group of unsecured creditors exists.' 09 In
addition, section 1102(a)(2) specifically authorizes the court to order the
appointment of additional committees in the event that the U.S. Trustee does
not do so. Section 1102(a)(2) states that "[o]n the request of a party in
interest, the court may order the appointment of additional committees of
creditors or of equity security holders if necessary to assure adequate
representation of creditors or of equity security holders. The United States
trustee shall appoint any such committee.""
While there are advantages to appointing additional committees, these
benefits must be weighed against the often significant costs and complexities
resulting therefrom. Because an additional creditors' committee appointed
pursuant to section 1102(a) appears to enjoy the same rights as the first
duly-appointed official creditors' committee,"' such a committee can serve
as an effective advocate for its specific constituency of creditors. On the
other hand, multiple committees can complicate negotiations, delay the
reorganization process, and create additional administrative expenses to the

108. As noted in the Senate Report to the 1978 Act, "In the case of a public company
there are likely to be several committees, each representing a different class of security
holders .... " S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5900.

109. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). For example, it may be appropriate to appoint separate
committees for bank, trade, and subordinated debt holders based on their different
expectations and relationships with the debtor.
110. Id. § 1102(a)(2). It appears that a Chapter 11 debtor may be a party in interest

for purposes of requesting the appointment of an additional creditors' committee. See In
re The Bible Speaks, 69 B.R. 72, 73 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986).
111. See In re Wilnor Drilling, Inc., 29 B.R. 727, 730-31 (Bankr. S.D. III. 1982)
(holding that fees and expenses of special investors' committee were entitled to same
administrative priority as those of the official creditors' committee); see also Blain &
O'Gawa, supranote 2, at 592 (citing In re Evans Prods. Co., 58 B.R. 572, 575 (Bankr.

S.D. Fla. 1985)). But see In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 142 B.R. 593, 594-96 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1992) (declining to allow "Lenders Committee" representing the interests of
77 secured creditors to employ counsel at estate's expense, on the grounds that counsel's

effort would be duplicative of that of the official committee and that any benefit to the
estate would be outweighed by the cost).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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debtor's estate, particularly in terms of higher professional fees. 1 2 Some
courts, however, have admonished that cost alone should not deprive
unrepresented creditors of a separate committee.' 13 In addition, courts are
understandably reluctant to order the appointment of additional committees
late in the case, particularly where a plan of reorganization is on file and
proceeding toward confirmation."' Thus, despite the legislative history

that seems to encourage the appointment of multiple committees in large
cases, "Bankruptcy Courts generally have been reluctant to [order the
appointment of] separate committees of unsecured creditors notwithstanding
the diverse and sometimes conflicting interest of such creditors in the
context of a Chapter 11 proceeding."" 5 This is particularly troublesome
where creditors on the committee have not only different financial motivations, but also claims entitled to different legal priorities. For example,
employee claims might be entitled to priority under Bankruptcy Code section
507(a)(3), whereas nonpecuniary loss penalty claims might be subordinated." 6 In certain cases, the problem can be severe, such as where both

112. See Cumberland Farms, 142 B.R. at 595-96; In re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 B.R.
767, 778-79 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); In re Texaco, 79 B.R. at 567; Alberto v. JohnsManville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 68 B.R. 155, 160 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986), appeal dismissed, 824 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Beker Phosphate Corp., 55
B.R. 945, 949 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Shaffer-Gordon Assocs., 40 B.R. 956, 958
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
113. See In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The
potential added cost is not sufficient in itself to deprive the creditors of the formation of
an additional committee if one is otherwise appropriate."); In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc., 118 B.R. 209,211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re McLean Indus.,
70 B.R. at 860 ("Cost alone cannot, and should not, deprive public debt and security
holders of representation.").
114. See Manville Corp. v. Equity See. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville
Corp.), 801 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1986); Ad Hoc Bondholders Group v. Interco Inc. (In
re Interco Inc.), 141 B.R. 422 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992); In re Eastern Me. Elec. Coop.,
121 B.R. 917 (Bankr. D. Me. 1990) (holding that it was too late to form additional
committees when three competing plans had already been proposed); In re Public Serv.
Co., 116 B.R. 344, 345 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990) (bankruptcy court would not appoint
additional committee of equity holders when disclosure statement had already been
approved and authorization of additional committee so late in reorganization process
would result in unwarranted delay and expense); In re McLean Indus., 70 B.R. at
862-63.
115. In re Public Serv. Co., 89 B.R. 1014, 1020 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (citing In re
Shaffer-Gordon Assocs., 40 B.R. 956 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Saxon Indus., 39
B.R. 945 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 45 B.R. 375 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1983)); see also In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. at 5-6 (court generally will
not appoint separate committees except in very large cases).
116. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1988); In re Quality Sign Co., 51 B.R. 351, 353
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1985) (subordinating tax penalty claim).
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senior and subordinated debenture holders sit on the committee and the
reorganization value of the debtor only covers the senior debt.
Because of the statutorily created dual role played by the courts and the
U.S. Trustees in appointing additional creditors' committees, it is somewhat
unclear how much weight must be given to a U.S. Trustee's affirmative
decision to appoint multiple committees under section 1102(a)(1). In light
of the "deems appropriate" language employed in section 1102(a)(1), it
appears that, absent a court order requiring multiple committees entered
pursuant to section 1102(a)(2), the U.S. Trustee should have broad
discretion in deciding whether to appoint additional committees. 117 In In
re Sharon Steel Corp.,"' however, the court vacated the U.S. Trustee's
decision to appoint a second committee comprised of debenture holders,
holding that the appointment of multiple committees was an "extraordinary
remedy" and that there had been an insufficient showing of the benefits of
doing so." 9 Thus, despite the apparently broad language of section
1102(a)(1) to the contrary, the Sharon Steel court seemed to take much of
the discretion away from the U.S. Trustee by making the question whether
to appoint multiple committees a question of law for the courts to decide.
Sharon Steel appears to be the minority view with respect to the review
of the U.S. Trustee's decisions made pursuant to section 1102(a)(1).
However, the opinion is consistent with the majority view in respect to the
application of section 1102(a)(2), which permits the court to order the
appointment of an additional committee notwithstanding any contrary
decision by the U.S. Trustee. When a party in interest objects to the U.S.
Trustee's decision not to appoint a committee, or when the U.S. Trustee
simply takes no action, the majority view appears to be that the court need
not give the U.S. Trustee's position much, if any, weight or deference in
deciding whether to order the appointment of an additional committee
pursuant to section 1102(a)(2).W Thus, unlike the U.S. Trustee's appointment of individual committee members under section 1102(a)(1), most
courts have agreed that the decision whether to order the appointment of an
additional committee under section 1102(a)(2) is a question of law subject
to a court's de novo review of the particular facts and circumstances
warranting such appointment.' 2 ' Generally, in determining whether to
117. See In re First RepublicBank, 95 B.R. 58, 60-61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (U.S.
Trustee's decision to appoint an additional creditors' committee reviewed under
"arbitrary and capricious" standard).
118. 100 B.R. 767 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
119. Id. at 778-79.
120. For example, in the Texaco case, Judge Schwartzberg held that "the court must
arrive at its own judgment, although the court may consider reasons advanced by the
United States Trustee in the event that such a request was previously submitted to the

United States Trustee." In re Texaco Inc., 79 B.R. 560, 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
121. See Sharon Steel, 100 B.R. at 776; In re Texaco Inc., 79 B.R. at 566; see also
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order a new committee to be formed, a court will consider factors such "as
the ability of the committee to function, the nature of the case and the
standing and desires of the various constituencies."
However, as noted
in the Sharon Steel case, most courts should not, and indeed will not,
appoint an additional creditors' committee absent a clear need, including
evidence that the new committee will not merely duplicate the services
already being performed by an existing committee.
2. Specific Types of Additional Committees
a. Generally
Besides committees for the holders of equity securities and certain
retiree benefits, the Bankruptcy Code does not identify what other types of
additional committees may be appointed during a case. In that respect, the
courts and U.S. Trustees have been creative at times, establishing committees to meet the special needs of a case." The paragraphs that follow
discuss the most commonly appointed kinds of additional committees.
b. Equity Committees
Section 1102(a)(1) authorizes the U.S. Trustee to appoint a committee
of equity security holders as it "deems appropriate." As a general matter,
equity committees have rights and duties similar to those of creditors'
committees, such as the right to employ professionals, but equity committees

are far less important because equity holders often have a nominal stake in
the outcome of the case. To the extent there is value for equity, courts
generally appear to believe-rightly or wrongly-that the debtor should be

In re Public Serv. Co., 89 B.R. at 1021 n.9 (contrasting the U.S. Trustee's broad
discretionary authority in initially appointing a committee against the court's power to
review changes to the committee structure during the course of a case).
In Texaco, the court also considered the interesting question whether a party
desiring the appointment of an additional committee must first make a demand upon the
U.S. Trustee to appoint one. Judge Schwartzberg held that because § 1102(a)(2) does not
create a standard for reviewing the U.S. Trustee's action, but rather grounds for a
judicial determination regarding the need for additional committees, there is no
administrative exhaustion requirement. 79 B.R. at 566; accord,In re McLean Indus., 70
B.R. at 857-58; cf. In re First RepublicBank, 95 B.R. at 60 (no administrative exhaustion
requirement for challenging individual committee appointments).
122. In re Interco, 141 B.R. at 424 (citing In re Hills Stores, 137 B.R. at 5-6; In re
McLean Indus., 70 B.R. at 860).
123. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 65 B.R. at 163 (committee appointed to
represent Dalkon Shield victims with claims against the debtor); Johns-Manville Corp.
v. Asbestos Litig. Group (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983) (committee appointed to represent asbestos victims with claims against the debtor).
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looking out for equity's interests, and thus an equity committee rarely is
necessary. The role of equity committees in the bankruptcy process is
beyond the scope of this Article.
c. Trade Committees
Because the U.S. Trustee ordinarily will select a debtor's seven largest
unsecured creditors to serve on a creditors' committee, 2 4 trade creditors
are often excluded in favor of large institutional bondholders. Thus,
appointing a committee based upon size alone may not adequately represent
all unsecured creditors. Often, the interests of trade creditors will differ
significantly from those of institutional creditors who do not conduct
business with the debtor on a day-to-day basis and who may not be
particularly interested in the debtor's reorganization. Similarly, small trade
vendors may be more interested in a plan that will give them prompt cash
distributions at less than one hundred cents on the dollar, rather than
receiving securities with higher theoretical returns over longer periods of
time. While the U.S. Trustee may account for the interests of trade creditors
by appointing a larger official committee or by exercising its discretion to
appoint persons other than the seven largest creditors," the appointment
of a separate trade committee may also provide an alternative avenue for
trade representation. 126
d. Secured Creditors' Committees
Although unsecured and undersecured creditors may sit on official
creditors' committees absent evidence of an actual conflict, 7 the requirement of section 1102(a)(1) that the official committee contain "unsecured"
creditors means that fully secured creditors may not be members of such
committees. I" Section 1102(a), however, authorizes the appointment of
"additional committees of creditors" without reference to secured or
unsecured status.' 29 At present, the case law is unclear whether secured
creditors' committees may be appointed, though the majority view does

124. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (1988).
125. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
126. For example, the court in the Revco case appointed a separate trade committee
due to the presence of large institutional creditors. See In re Revco D.S., Inc., 118 B.R.
464 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
127. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.

128. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988) (stating that the official committee shall
consist of holders of "unsecured claims"); see also supra note 79.
129. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) & (2).
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permit them in limited circumstances.1 31 Of course, given that secured
creditors generally have interests in discrete items of collateral, their
interests often do not align well with other holders of secured claims.
Moreover, with the exception of relatively small secured creditors, such as
the typical holders of statutory liens, secured creditors often tend to be
financial institutions that generally do not need (or want) an official
committee to represent their interests. Nevertheless, a secured creditors'
committee may be useful in some cases such as those with widely held
secured debt. 131
e. Employee Committees

Both current and former employees of the debtor are playing increasingly important roles in the bankruptcy process. This is the result of a number
of factors, including increased employee sophistication regarding their rights
under the bankruptcy laws and a dramatic growth in the number of
employee claims due to an expansion of employee benefit programs and
rights of action against their employer. If the court does not authorize the
immediate payment of priority prepetition wage claims and employees
remain creditors of the estate,132 there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code
that prohibits the appointment of a special creditors' committee to represent
the employees' interests. With respect to holders of retiree benefits, the
appointment of a separate committee may sometimes be required as set forth

130. Compare In re Wekiva Dev. Corp., 22 B.R. 301 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982)
(declining to appoint secured creditors' committee) with In re Diversified Capital Corp.,
89 B.R. 826 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. i988) (holding that secured creditors' committee could
be appointed after plan confirmation but before plan was consummated); In re Fidelity
Am. Mortgage Co., Nos. 81-00386G to 81-00388G, 1981 WL 2100 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
July 29, 1981) (authorizing appointment of secured noteholders' committee); cf. In re
Combustion Equip. Assocs., 16 B.R. 354 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting without
comment the existence of secured creditors' committee); In re Cumberland Farms, 142
B.R. at 594-96 (recognizing secured creditors' committee, but not permitting it to employ
counsel at the expense of the estate). Frequently, secured creditors will be entitled to
assert claims for attorneys' and other professionals' fees against their collateral. See 11
U.S.C. § 506(b). Thus, groups of secured creditors usually are content to function as
unofficial committees.
131. See In re Cumberland Farms, 142 B.R. at 594 (involving a secured creditors'
committee which represented 77 secured lenders); In re Fidelity Am. Mortgage Co.,
1981 WL 2100.
132. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3); see also In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174,
178-79 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying interim payment of priority wages to certain
striking and furloughed employees because such payment was not necessary to the
reorganization effort).
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below.'
Courts have disagreed as to the utility of employee committees in
particular cases.' 34 Given the special protections for employee rights under
the Bankruptcy Code,' 35 it appears that employee committees generally
should not be necessary. Nevertheless, the decision to appoint an employee
committee should be made on a case-by-case basis based upon the same
factors used in determining whether to appoint other special committees. For
example, when there are several distinct employee groups asserting claims,
a committee representing their interests may prove particularly useful.
f. Retiree Committees
A specific type of employee-related committee identified in the
Bankruptcy Code is one appointed to represent the interests of retired
workers. Section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a labor union
generally shall act as the "authorized representative" of persons who are
entitled to receive retirement benefits from a Chapter 11 debtor pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement.' 36 Under section 1114(c)(2) and (d),
however, the court (rather than the U.S. Trustee) shall, after notice and a
hearing, appoint a committee to represent retirees in the event that the union
declines to serve as a representative, the retirees are not represented by a
union, or the court determines "that different representation of such persons
is appropriate.""' A committee appointed pursuant to section 1114 "shall
have the same rights, powers, and duties as committees appointed under
sections 1102 and 1103" for the limited purpose of representing the rights
of retired persons in the case. 3 '

133. See 11 U.S.C. § 1114(b)(2) & (d).
134. Compare In re Mansfield Ferrous Castings, Inc., 96 B.R. 779 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1988) (authorizing appointment of committee to represent employee creditors) and
United Steelworkers v. Lamp (In re Mesta Mach. Co.), 67 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1986) with In re Salant Corp., 53 B.R. 158, 161 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (declining
to authorize appointment of employee committee).
135. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (priority for certain unpaid wage claims); id.

§ 507(a)(4) (priority for certain contributions to employee benefit plans); id. § 1113
(special provisions for the rejection of collective bargaining agreements).
136. Id. § 1114(c)(1).

137. See id. § 1114(c)(2), (d). Frequently the union will have an actual conflict
between its duties to protect jobs for existing workers and benefits for retired workers.
A national union may also be more concerned with its own national policy than the
interests of retirees in a particular case. In these circumstances, different representation
should be required.

138. Id. § 1114(b)(2).
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D. Appointing a Single Committee for Multiple Debtors

The converse of the question whether multiple committees should be
appointed in a single-debtor case is whether a single creditors' committee
may be appointed in multiple-debtor cases. At one extreme, some courts
have held that separate committees must be appointed for each related debtor
entity.139 While not going quite that far, Bankruptcy Judge Bufford of the
Central District of California has adopted a "presumption" for two or more
related cases that, absent substantive consolidation, there must be a separate
creditors' committee for each debtor entity under any of the following
circumstances:
(a) Where the debtors' creditors have dealt with such debtors as an
economic unit (which may be reflected in guarantees and subordination
agreements);
(b) Where there is substantial creditor overlap;
(c) Where the affairs of the respective debtors (as reflected in
interdebtor accounts, jointly owned assets, guarantees, subordination
agreements, or shared officers, directors, or owners) appear to be
substantially entangled;
(d) Where assets have been transferred from one debtor to another
in transactions that are not at arms length; or
(e) Where piercing of the corporate veil of one of the debtors is
necessary or advisable to protect the rights of another debtor's credi40

tors. 1

One might wonder whether these grounds also could be used to justify the
appointment of a single creditors' committee, as each seems to indicate the
need for (or the desirability of) substantive consolidation and, thus, only one
creditors' committee. It is unclear whether multiple committees, if
appointed, should be merged (or perhaps eliminated) in the event of
substantive consolidation.
Other courts have expressed concern over appointing separate
committees for related debtors absent a clear need.' 41 These courts have
139. See, e.g., In re White Motor Credit Corp., 18 B.R. 720 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio

1980).
140. In re Lee, 94 B.R. 172, 180 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); see Gill v. Sierra Pac.
Constr., Inc. (In re Parkway Calabasas, Ltd.), 89 B.R. 832, 835 n.3 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1988).
141. See In re Orfa Corp., 121 B.R. 294 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting per se
rule that separate committees are needed for related debtors); In re McLean Indus., 70
B.R. 852, 862 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that the cost of maintaining separate
committees "could be extreme"); In re Salant Corp., 53 B.R. 158, 161 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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been motivated by the desire to avoid "the additional and unnecessary
administrative costs that would result if another committee and a potential
enclave of additional professionals [are] appointed."' 42 Given the potential
expense and administrative problems associated with multiple committees,
it would seem that the better practice would be to appoint a single creditors'
committee in most cases, and to rely upon such techniques as employing
special counsel, adopting recusal rules, or establishing special subcommittees
43
to deal with situations in which conflicts among the estates arise.
E. Unofficial Committees During the Course of the Case
A group of creditors that is dissatisfied with the existing committee
structure, or that desires to enhance the its influence over the reorganization
process, may form an unofficial committee during the course of a case.
Although the Code does not provide for unofficial committees, nothing in
the Code prevents them from forming, retaining counsel and other
professionals, and seeking reimbursement for expenses to the extent they
make a substantial contribution to the case, as permitted by section 503(b)
of the Code. Unofficial committee members may have their expenses
reimbursed if they meet the requirements of section 503(b)(3)(D), while
their professionals' fees and expenses may be reimbursed if they' meet the
requirements of section 503(b)(4).'"
IV. ALTERING COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE

A. Generally
No issue involving creditors' committees has been the subject of as
much concern as the ability to alter the composition of a committee.
Unfortunately, no other body of law governing creditors' committees
appears to be in such a current state of disarray. With almost no guidance
from Congress or the appellate courts, the bankruptcy courts have been left
to fashion rules regarding the removal and addition of committee members.
As a consequence, the case law does not represent a seamless web, but
rather more of a disjointed patchwork of decisions that cannot be reconciled
easily. The discussion that follows attempts to identify the few relatively
consistent themes in the case law.
Challenges regarding a committee's membership generally fall within
one of two categories: (1) that the committee should be expanded to include

142. In re Orfa Corp., 121 B.R. at 299.
143. See, e.g., In re Vermont Real Estate Inv. Trust, 20 B.R. 33 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1982) (recognizing recusal as a means to eliminate conflict of interest problems).
144. See In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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representatives of particular interests; and (2) that one or more members of
the existing committee should be removed because they do not satisfy the
standards set by section 1102 for one or more of the previously stated
reasons. Prior to the repeal of section 1102(c) in 1986, a party in interest
could ask the court to change the membership of a creditors' committee by
bringing a motion pursuant to that section.' 45 When Congress took the
appointment power away from the courts and placed it in the hands of the
U.S. Trustee, however, it failed to provide any express mechanism
empowering anyone, including the U.S. Trustee, to change the composition
of the committee; 14 6 nor did Congress specify a means for challenging the
U.S. Trustee's initial decisions to appoint, or not to appoint, particular
creditors to a committee.
While the law is by no means certain, it appears that the proper method
for requesting a change in committee membership is by bringing a motion
pursuant to Rule 2020 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.147
Rule 2020, however, is merely a procedural device to challenge the U.S.
Trustee's actions, stating that such challenges are to be treated as contested
matters under Rule 9014. The rule does not confer any substantive rights,
nor does it establish an appropriate standard of review. Indeed, as discussed
below, it is unclear what standard a court will employ in reviewing the U.S.
Trustee's decisions to appoint or remove committee members, and whether,
assuming a change in membership is warranted, the court will be willing to
148
undertake such action on its own.
One point is clear: a motion to challenge the U.S. Trustee's initial
appointment of members to an official committee should be brought as soon
as possible after the committee is formed. Similarly, a motion to alter the
membership of a committee during the course of a case should be made as
soon as the moving party becomes aware of the circumstances justifying

145. See In re Gates Eng'g, 104 B.R. 653, 654 (Bankr. D. Del. 1989). Prior to its
repeal, former § 1102(c) provided that:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court
may change the membership or the size of a committee appointed under
subsection (a) of this section if the membership of such committee is not
representative of the different kinds of claims or interests to be represented.
11 U.S.C. § 1102(c) (1982) (repealed by Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and
Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 221(2), 100 Stat. 3088,
3101).
146. See In re Public Serv. Co., 89 B.R. 1014, 1020-21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988).

147. Rule 2020 provides, "A proceeding to contest any act or failure to act by the
United States Trustee is governed by Rule 9014." FED. R. BANKR. P. 2020. Rule 9014,
in turn, governs the procedures applicable to contested matters. See FED. R. BANKR. P.
9014.
148. See In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 133 B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

39

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 10

1034

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:995

such a change. Otherwise, the court may find the motion to be untimely
because the committee already may have taken significant action in the case,
such as retaining professionals, developing and negotiating reorganization
149
strategies, or filing a plan and disclosure statement with the court.
While it may be good practice to bring any concerns about committee
membership to the attention of the U.S. Trustee first, there is no administrative exhaustion requirement. 50 Thus, a party in interest seeking to alter
a committee's membership may bring a motion without first requesting the
U.S. Trustee to act.
B. Standardof Review for Challenging the U.S. Trustee's
Appointment Decisions
As discussed above, section 1102 provides that an official creditors'
committee must consist of persons who are representative of the committee's
constituency. Also, members must either hold unsecured claims against the
estate or, in some cases, represent persons that hold such claims against the
estate. Because compliance with section 1102 is a question of both fact and
law, a court ordinarily would consider such a matter de novo, relying upon
its own fact-finding and interpretations of the appropriate legal standards.
However, the U.S. Trustee's role in committee selection has created much
controversy regarding the court's power to determine whether the requirements of section 1102 have been satisfied and, particularly, whether the

149. See Van Arsdale v. Clemo, 825 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding motion to
challenge committee appointments untimely when brought seven weeks after appointment,
by which time important decisions were made on such issues as appointment of
committee attorneys and formulation of negotiation strategy); see also In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 118 B.R. 209, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("A motion
under section 1102 should be made promptly."); In re Public Serv. Co., 116 B.R. 344,
345 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990) (party requesting appointment of new committee should not
delay in making such a request).

150. As stated by the court in In re First RepublicBank Corp.:
The United States trustee has not provided for administrative review of its
committee membership decisions. Administrative review would be cumbersome, burdensome, wasteful and unnecessary given the court's authority under
§ 105(a). Under § 105(a) this court may on motion of a party in interest or
on its own motion review the United States trustee's decision on the question
of committee membership to determine if the trustee acted arbitrarily and

capriciously.
95 B.R. 58, 60 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (citing In re McLean Indus., 70 B.R. 852, 856-

58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies not
required)). Of course, routine administrative matters within the U.S. Trustee's
jurisdiction generally should be brought first to the attention of the U.S. Trustee, not the

court. See id.
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court must defer to the U.S. Trustee's conclusions.
The cases generally adopt one of three different standards for reviewing
the U.S. Trustee's appointment decisions: Total deference to the U.S.
Trustee's appointment decisions, under which the court is precluded from
taking any corrective action; partial deference to such decisions, under
which the court will uphold the U.S. Trustee's decisions so long as they are
reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious;' 52 and no deference to such
decisions, under which the court reviews appointment decisions de
novo. 53 The apparent trend among recently reported decisions appears to
be toward partial deference. As discussed below, however, even the courts
that have agreed to give the U.S. Trustee's decisions some deference have
disagreed as to the precise terms of that standard. 5 4
Courts that follow the recent trend of partial deference generally rely
upon the fact that, in appointing a creditors' committee, the U.S. Trustee is
performing an administrative task similar to that of any executive branch
official. 155 Although Congress's repeal of section 1102(c) transferred the
151. See In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("While I
may order the appointment of additional committees under § 1102(a)(2) of the Code, the
statute no longer permits the addition or deletion of members of committees by the
court. ..

").

152. See Locks v. United States Trustee, 157 B.R. 89, 92 (W.D. Pa. 1993)
(employing "abuse of discretion" standard); In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 133 B.R. 174
(holding that although a bankruptcy court cannot change the official committee
membership by substituting its judgment for that of the U.S. Trustee, the court may
review the U.S. Trustee's refusal to appoint a creditor to the committee under an abuse
of discretion standard); In re Gates Eng'g, 104 B.R. 653, 654 (Bankr. D. Del. 1989)
(finding the U.S. Trustee acted "appropriately" in excluding a creditor from the
committee); In re First RepublicBank, 95 B.R. at 60 (requiring that the U.S. Trustee's
appointment decisions be upheld unless "arbitrary and capricious"); In re Public Serv.
Co., 89 B.R. 1014, 1021 n.9 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (characterizing the U.S. Trustee's
initial appointment of a creditors' committee as an "administrative function"). Note that,
as discussed infra notes 154-167 and accompanying text, the partial deference standard
appears still to be in the development stage, and its application from case to case is not
entirely consistent.
153. In re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 B.R. 767, 786 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); In re
Texaco Inc., 79 B.R. 560 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). In Texaco, Judge Schwartzberg
reasoned that "the concept of adequate representation is a legal issue which must be
resolved judicially," and, therefore, the U.S. Trustee's appointment decisions are entitled
to no deference. 79 B.R. at 566 (following In re McLean Indus., 70 B.R. at 859). "ITihe
court must arrive at its own judgment, although the court may consider reasons advanced
by the United States Trustee in the event that [a request to change the committee] was
previously submitted to the United States Trustee." Id.
154. Note that the decision to appoint (or not to appoint) a particular committee
member is final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d
1034, 1041 (3d Cir. 1985).
155. See, e.g., In re First RepublicBank, 95 B.R. at 60 ("The United States trustee
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principal authority to determine committee membership to the U.S. Trustee,
the majority view is that the courts have retained their authority to review
the U.S. Trustee's decisions as they would any other administrative
act-specifically to determine whether the U.S. Trustee acted "arbitrarily
and capriciously."' 56
Given that a number of courts treat the U.S. Trustee's appointment
power as an administrative function, it is not surprising that at least two
bankruptcy courts have held that the U.S. Trustee's Office is an "agency"
within the scope of the Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA"). 5 7 The
courts have disagreed, however, about the extent to which the APA governs
the U.S. Trustee's actions. In Sharon Steel, the court interpreted section 554(a)(1) of the APA 5 8 as making that statute applicable only to those
agency decisions where
Congress has required an agency hearing to be held
"on the record." 59 Because the statutory language and legislative history
of section 1102(a) are silent regarding whether the U.S. Trustee must hold
a hearing when selecting committee members, the court concluded that no
such hearing is required, and that the APA did not apply."W Accordingly,
the Sharon Steel court held that the U.S. Trustee's appointments to a
committee are subject to de novo review. 6
While Sharon Steel is correct in holding that the U.S. Trustee need not
conduct a formal hearing prior to appointing a committee, it does not follow
that the U.S. Trustee's actions are entitled to no deference. As recognized
by the court in In re Vance, section 706 of the APA 62 provides that a
court generally should defer to an agency's informal decision making unless
it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."163 Thus, contrary to the holding in Sharon Steel, the
existence of formal proceedings is not a prerequisite to according judicial
deference to the U.S. Trustee's administrative decisions. Although Vance
involved the U.S. Trustee's decision whether to conclude a section 341(a)

has administrative authority over committee membership.") (citing H.R. REP. No. 764,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5227, 5241).
156. Id.
157. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-706 (1988)); see In re Vance, 120 B.R. 181, 186 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990); In
re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 B.R. at 785; see also In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group,
Inc., 118 B.R. 209,211 n.1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (suggesting, without deciding, that
the APA may apply to committee appointment decisions).

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(1) (1988).
100 B.R. at 785-86.
Id. at 786.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).

163. 120 B.R. 181, 195-96 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).
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meeting of creditors, its interpretation of the APA also supports the
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard to the U.S. Trustee's
committee appointments.'6
C. Challenging the Committee's Composition During the Case
Even if there are no objections to the U.S. Trustee's appointments at
the commencement of the case, during the course of a case it may be
advisable to change the composition of the creditors' committee. Often, this
is because a member resigns, a creditor seeks membership on the committee, or questions arise regarding an existing member's status as an adequate
representative of the committee's constituency. For example, in the America
West Airlines case,"' Kawasaki, a large trade creditor, was included
among the eight initial members of the official creditors' committee. About
six months after Kawasaki's appointment to the committee, it loaned the
debtor $23 million in debtor in possession financing, secured by liens on
substantially all of the debtor's assets. The debtor also assumed significant
aircraft finance agreements with Kawasaki, potentially giving Kawasaki
substantial administrative claims against the estate in the event of a default
on the financing arrangement. In response to the concerns of other
committee members that Kawasaki might be more interested in its secured
and administrative priority claims than in the welfare of unsecured creditors
generally, the U.S. Trustee removed Kawasaki from the committee. In
upholding the U.S. Trustee's decision, the bankruptcy court applied an
abuse of discretion standard, determining that the decision to remove
Kawasaki was not arbitrary and capricious.166 The America West Airlines
decision is consistent with the emerging trend that, as with challenges to the
U.S. Trustee's initial appointments to a creditors' committee, the removal
or appointment of additional committee members during the course of the
case is within the limited discretion of the U.S. Trustee. 167

164. Unfortunately, there have been few reported decisions demonstrating how the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard applies in the bankruptcy context, or how it differs
in application from de novo review. One example of arbitrary and capricious judgment
on the part of the U.S. Trustee might be the failure to remove a committee member who
has a clear conflict of interest. See In re First RepublicBank, 95 B.R. 58, 61 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1988). However, such a situation probably would lead to the same result
under either standard of review. In practice, the distinction between the two standards
may be analogous to the difference between the evidentiary standards of preponderance
and clear and convincing-the difference being shades of gray rather than black and
white.
165. In re America W. Airlines, 142 B.R. 901 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992).
166. Id. at 902-03.
167. See, e.g., In re Wheeler Technology, Inc., 139 B.R. 235, 238-39 (Bankr. 9th
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One of the most common grounds for seeking to remove a committee
member is breach of duty, as claimed in In re Public Service Co. when the
U.S. Trustee removed an uncooperative member of the committee at the
request of various other committee members. 6 An actual conflict of
interest, as cited in America West, is a second ground for removal. The most
common ground for adding a member is that the existing committee does not
adequately represent a particular type of creditor interest.' 69
If a court determines that committee membership should be altered
during the course of the case, what can the court do about it? If the issue
involves an objection by a party in interest to an entity who is serving on the
committee, the court should be able to order the U.S. Trustee to remove that
individual; otherwise, judicial review would be meaningless. Conceivably,
the court might be able to hold the U.S. Trustee in civil contempt until the
creditor in question is removed. Unfortunately, the courts have not always
been willing to provide a remedy in such cases. 17
An even more difficult question arises when the court believes that the
creditors' committee needs additional representatives of a particular creditor
group in order to satisfy section 1102's representativeness requirements. On
the one extreme, some courts have held that section 105(a) gives the court
the power to order the U.S. Trustee to appoint a specific creditor to a
committee, even after the repeal of section 1102(c).' 7 On the other

Cir. 1992); In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 133 B.R. 174, 175-76 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991);
In re Public Serv. Co., 89 B.R. 1014, 1020-21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988).
168. In re Public Serv. Co., 89 B.R. at 1019.
169. See, e.g., id. at 1020-21.
170. Compare, e.g., In re Wheeler Technology, Inc., 139 B.R. at 238-39 (determin-

ing that a court cannot remove committee member as a sanction for violating an
automatic stay); In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("While

I may order the appointment of additional committees under § 1102(a)(2) of the Code,
the statute no longer permits the addition or deletion of members of committees by the
court.... ."); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 118 B.R. 209, 211 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (concluding that the issue of inadequate representation is to be resolved

by creation of new committee, not by the court's appointment of new members to an
existing committee); In re Gates Eng'g, 104 B.R. 653, 654 (Bankr. D. Del. 1989) with,
e.g., In re Texaco Inc., 79 B.R. 560, 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that a
court's power to alter committee membership survived the repeal of § 1102(c)); see also

In re American W. Airlines, 142 B.R. 901 (U.S. Trustee has authority to remove
committee members).
171. See, e.g., In re Plabell Rubber Prods., 140 B.R. 179 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992)
(holding that court has power under § 105(a) to add labor union to committee); In re
Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 133 B.R. at 176 (holding that, although bankruptcy court could

not substitute its judgment for that of the U.S. Trustee regarding composition of official
committee of unsecured creditors, court could review for abuse of discretion U.S.
Trustee's refusal to appoint creditor and could order appropriate relief pursuant to §
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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extreme, some courts have held that the repeal of section 1102(c) eliminated
the court's authority to order the appointment or removal of committee
members in all circumstances. These courts have found that the only avenue
available for a court faced with an unrepresentative committee is to order
the appointment of an additional committee pursuant to section 1102(a)(2).172
Taking what might be considered the "middle ground," the court in In
re Public Service Co. held that it could order the U.S. Trustee to alter
committee membership, but should, nevertheless, allow the U.S. Trustee
discretion when deciding how to make an existing creditors' committee more
representative.17 ' The court reasoned that, if it had the authority to create
a new committee, it certainly had the power to provide the "lesser" remedy
of directing the U.S. Trustee to alter the composition of an existing
creditors' committee." The court was careful not to identify specific
persons who should be added to the committee. Instead, the court ordered
the U.S. Trustee to name two additional debenture holders, leaving the U.S.
Trustee "full discretion in determining those individuals to be appointed.""75 Based on these authorities, one could conclude that a court's power
to fashion an appropriate remedy is limited by the standard of review and
the deference to be afforded the decision of the U.S. Trustee; the greater the
deference, the less authority the court will have to order the U.S. Trustee
to fashion a particular remedy.
D. Debtor's Standing to Seek to Alter the Committee's Membership
Since the creditors' committee represents only the interests of its
constituents-the unsecured creditors-the question arises as to whether the
debtor has standing to challenge the committee's composition. Section
1109(b), which gives the debtor and other parties in interest the right to be

105); In re First RepublicBank, 95 B.R. at 60.
172. See, e.g., In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. at 8; In re Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group, Inc., 118 B.R. 209. In Drexel, two joint liquidators of a British-based subsidiary

of the debtor requested that the U.S. Trustee appoint them to the creditors' committee
in the parent's case in New York. When the U.S. Trustee refused, the liquidators moved
the bankruptcy court to order their appointment pursuant to § 1102(a). Relying on the
plain language of § 1102(a), Bankruptcy Judge Buschman held that Congress had vested
the authority to select members of a committee with the U.S. Trustee alone, and that
"inadequate representation is to be addressed by a court through the creation of another
committee." 118 B.R. at 211.
173. 89 B.R. at 1020-21.
174. Id. at 1021. It is by no means clear that this constitutes a "lesser" remedy.
175. Id. The court, however, did try to offer some helpful advice by encouraging the
U.S. Trustee to appoint persons "with prior Chapter 11 experience if at all possible." Id.
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heard "on any issue in a case," appears to grant the debtor the right to
challenge committee membership. The courts have generally acknowledged
this right. 76 Even if the debtor has the right to challenge the committee's
makeup, one can certainly question its motives in doing so. The debtor often
has an incentive to desire a weak creditors' committee; therefore, the
debtor's real interest in seeking to alter the committee's membership may
be to make it less effective. Nevertheless, the debtor's input may be useful
when the debtor has information regarding a conflict of interest, or when the
debtor and the committee have reached an impasse in negotiations.
V. THE COMMITEE'S FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONS
A. Powers and Duties of the Committee
1. General Committee Powers
As the official representative of the unsecured creditors, the creditors'
committee must have the means available to it to have a significant impact
on the course of the case. Recognizing this, Congress drafted the Bankruptcy Code to provide a long list of actions that a creditors' committee may
take in fulfilling its fiduciary responsibilities to its constituents. Under
section 1103, a creditors' committee may perform the following duties:
select and authorize the employment of attorneys, accountants, or other
professionals or agents to represent or perform services for the committee;
"consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the administration of the case"; investigate the debtor's financial condition, the operation
of the debtor's business, and other matters relevant to the case or the
formulation of a plan; participate in the formulation of a plan and advise its
constituents regarding the desirability of a plan; "request the appointment
of a trustee or examiner"; and "perform such other services as are in the
interest of those represented.""' Under section 1109(b), the committee
also "may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case. "171
Nevertheless, in spite of a committee's broad statutory powers, the
authority of debtors-in-possession under section 1107 to carry out nearly all
of the powers and duties of a trustee significantly tempers the committee's
role in carrying out actions on behalf of the estate. The committee may
make its views known, but it generally may not take over the day-to-day
176. See In re Plant Specialties, Inc., 59 B.R. 1 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (discussing
debtors' rights to challenge appointment of person to committee who will be detrimental
to reorganization efforts); In re M.H. Corp., 30 B.R. 266,267 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983);
see also In re Penn-Dixie Indus., 9 B.R. 936, 938-39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating
that Chapter 11 debtor has standing to challenge composition of equity security holders'

committee).
177. 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988).
178. Id. § 1109(b).
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business operations of the debtor. 79 During the case, it is the debtor in
possession who is the legal representative of the estate. 80 As the party
charged principally with managing the affairs of the estate, the debtor in
possession may assume and reject contracts,' propose asset sales, enter
into financing agreements, recover preferences and fraudulent conveyances,
and sue on behalf of the estate. While the committee's opinions on these
matters generally are entitled to some weight, particularly when there is
little chance of equity retaining any interests in the case, " the debtor's
business judgment decisions usually are entitled to substantial deference. The
creditors' committee, however, will still be busy carrying out its principal
tasks of protecting and promoting the interests of its constituents and
attempting to maximize any recoveries from the estate for them. 8 3
Moreover, as discussed further herein, the committee may sometimes be
authorized to carry out certain functions generally done by the debtor when
the debtor is unable or unwilling to perform such duties.
2. Employment of Professionals
As one of its first official acts, a creditors' committee typically will
select its counsel and other professionals, such as accountants or financial
advisors. An official creditors' committee, as well as any other committee
appointed pursuant to section 1102, may, with the bankruptcy court's
approval, employ one or more attorneys, accountants, or other professionals
at the expense of the estate. "8To do so, the committee must comply with
179. See id. § 1107(a) (debtor in possession generally has powers of a trustee); id.
§ 1108 (trustee is authorized to operate debtor's business); see also In re Structurlite
Plastics Corp., 91 B.R. 813, 819 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) ("[A] creditors' committee's
functions do not include an involvement in the debtor in possession's day-to-day
operations.").
180. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 323(a), 1107(a).
181. At least one court has held that a creditors' committee has standing under §
1109(b) to move to reject a collective bargaining agreement. In re Parrot Packing Co.,
42 B.R. 323, 328-30 (N.D. Ind. 1983). While unusual, this result is not surprising,
especially because a collective bargaining agreement may be rejected as part of a
creditors' plan of reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(2). Section 1113(a), however,
generally allows only trustees and debtors-in-possession to reject collective bargaining
agreements in Chapter 11 cases outside the context of a plan.
182. See In re After Six, Inc., 154 B.R. 876, 882-83 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
183. See In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 140 B.R. 482, 488-89 (Bankr. N.D. fI1.
1992) (stating that a creditors' committee is "entitled to represent its constituents by
seeking to administer [the] estate in a manner different than that favored by the trustee");
In re AKF Foods, Inc., 36 B.R. 288, 289 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that
creditors' committee "is to act as a watchdog on behalf of the larger body of creditors
which it represents").
184. Section 1103(a) provides that:
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Rule 2014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which requires
that an application be filed with the court and, except in cases under Chapter
9, be transmitted to the U.S. Trustee. The application must (1) set forth
specific facts demonstrating the need for the employment, (2) identify the
professional to be employed, (3) set forth the reasons why that professional
was selected, (4) discuss the nature of the services to be rendered, (5)
disclose any proposed arrangement for compensation, and (6) disclose any
potential conflicts of interest, such as pre-existing relationships with the
debtor or individual creditors." 5 The fact that the professional represents
one or more creditors within the same class represented by the committee
does not constitute a per se impermissible conflict barring employment by
the committee. 8 6 Nevertheless, courts should be careful to ensure the
professional's impartiality where an individual committee member's
professional also acts on behalf of the committee. "n

At a scheduled meeting of a committee appointed under section 1102
of... title [11], at which a majority of the members of such committee are
present, and with the court's approval, such committee may select and
authorize the employment by such committee of one or more attorneys,
accountants, or other agents, to represent or perform services for such
committee.
11 U.S.C. § 1103(a); see In re Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc., 142 B.R. 918, 921
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1992) (denying committee's application to employ accountant in part
because of committee's failure to comply with § 1103(a)); see also infra notes 252-255.
Similarly, § 328(a) provides, inter alia, "[A] committee appointed under section 1102
of ... title [11], with the court's approval, may employ or authorize the employment
of a professional person under [11 U.S.C. § 1103] ...

on any reasonable terms and

conditions of employment, including on a retainer, on an hourly basis, or on a contingent
fee basis."
11 U.S.C. § 328(a); cf In re Sunshine Precious Metals, 142 B.R. at 920-21 (denying
committee's application to employ accountant to investigate debtor's affairs, in part due
to lack of showing of need); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 140 B.R. 367
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying committee's motion to employ financial advisor for
lack of sufficient information regarding the retention); In re The Bible Speaks, 67 B.R.
426 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (denying committee's application to employ two co-counsel
on the ground that the committee failed to demonstrate the need for multiple legal
representation); In re UNR Indus., 42 B.R. 94 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984).
185. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a).
186. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(b); see, e.g., In re Rusty Jones, Inc., 107 B.R. 161 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that counsel for certain individual unsecured creditors could also
serve as counsel for creditors' committee). But see In re Electro-Optix, U.S.A., Inc.,
130 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (ordering committee counsel removed and fees
disallowed because, inter alia, counsel continued to represent major creditor individually).
187. See In re Whitman, 101 B.R. 37, 38 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (holding that
counsel for partially secured creditor could not act as counsel for the unsecured creditors'
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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As with the debtor's professionals, professionals employed by the
creditors' committee may be compensated pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
sections 330 and 331.188 While professionals' fee issues are generally
beyond the scope of this Article, there is one point relating specifically to
creditors' committees worth noting here. Although the rule is not clear, it
appears that the committee may be entitled to retain and pay professionals,
even though it is unlikely that any distributions will be made to unsecured
creditors.' 89 In this regard, one court has reasoned that the creditors'
committee is at least entitled to an opportunity to have its professionals
determine whether there are sufficient assets in the estate to make distributions to unsecured creditors.19 Nevertheless, courts must make sure the
committee's professionals economize and do not take advantage on behalf
of a client who is not "in the money." Finally, at least one court has
suggested that a committee may be able to recover expenses and obtain
compensation for its professionals pursuant to section 506(c), which
generally provides reimbursement to a trustee of "the reasonable, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, [property securing an
obligation] to the extent of any benefit to the holder of [the secured]
claim."

191

3. Committee's Standing

As discussed above, sections 1103 and 1109 grant creditors' committees
broad authority to represent the interests of their constituents and to "appear
and be heard on any issue in a case. " " Nevertheless, some controversy

committee, reasoning that the interests between secured and unsecured creditors are
"dramatically different").
188. 11 U.S.C. §§ 330, 331 (1988). By contrast, committees in Chapter 7 cases
generally may not employ professionals at the expense of the estate. In re Dominelli, 788
F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir. 1986).
189. See Citibank, N.A. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Wilson Freight Co. (In re
Wilson Freight Co.), 21 B.R. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Joyanna Holitogs, Inc., 19
13.R. 406 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). But see In re Chips'N Twigs, Inc., 58 B.R. 109, 111
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (denying compensation to a committee's professionals where
there were insufficient funds to pay in full all other administrative expenses).
190. In re Joyanna Holitogs, Inc., 19 B.R. at 408.
191. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988), cited in In re Codesco, Inc., 15 B.R. 354, 355-56
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). But see In re S & S Indus., 30 B.R. 395, 397 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1983) (holding that secured creditor is not required to pay committee's legal fees
absent clear consent); In re New England Carpet Co., 28 B.R. 766, 771 (Bankr. D. Vt.)
(holding that attorney for unsecured creditor's committee was not entitled to award of
attorney's fees where attorney's efforts toward reorganization did not benefit secured
creditors), aff'd, 38 B.R. 703 (D. Vt. 1983), aff'd, 744 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984).
192. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1988).
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exists as to when a creditor's committee may commence an adversary
proceeding, and when such a committee may intervene in an adversary
proceeding commenced by the debtor or a trustee.
a. Standing to Commence an Adversary Proceeding
While creditors' committees generally may raise matters arising in the
case itself,"9 courts have shown some reluctance to permit committees to
commence adversary proceedings on behalf of the estate, at least when the
debtor is able and willing to do so."9 Typically such proceedings are to
avoid fraudulent and preferential transfers, to recover damages for breaches
of fiduciary duty by the debtor's directors and officers, and to subordinate
insider claims pursuant to section 510.
To file an adversary proceeding on the estate's behalf, the creditors'
committee usually must demonstrate that (1) a colorable claim exists that the
debtor has not pursued, (2) the committee made a demand upon the debtor
to bring the action, and (3) the debtor unjustifiably refused to pursue the
action following the demand. 95 This showing may have to be made at a
hearing prior to the filing of the committee's complaint,' even when the
committee's members are financing the litigation at no expense to the

193. See, e.g., United States v. Unsecured Creditors' Comm. (In re C-T of Virginia,
Inc.), 977 F.2d 137 (4th Cir. 1992) (allowing creditors' committee to object to tax claim
without any discussion of standing issue); Unsecured Creditor's Comm. v. Marepcon
Fin. Corp. (In re Bumper Sales, Inc.), 907 F.2d 1430 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that
committee had standing to challenge secured creditor's motion to condition use of cash
collateral); In re Metropolitan Hosp., 110 B.R. 731 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that
bondholders' committee had standing to challenge proposed setoff of prepetition
obligations), aft'd, 131 B.R. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
194. See, e.g., Louisiana World Exposition, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233,
247 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. U.S. Nat'l Bank
(In re Suffola, Inc.), 2 F.3d 977, 979 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing "a qualified
implied authorization" to commence adversary proceedings in limited circumstances). At
least one court, however, has held that the creditors' committee has a "duty" to sue on
behalf of the estate when the debtor unjustifiably fails to do so. In re First Capital
Holdings Corp., 146 B.R. 7, 11 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992). But C. In re Overmyer, 30
B.R. 123 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that trustee was not bound by committee's
failure to bring action on behalf of the estate because committee had no duty to bring
such an action).
195. A creditors' committee may not bring a particular action on behalf of the
debtor's estate if the debtor has already done so. See, e.g., In re First Capital Holdings,
146 B.R. at 10 (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. First Union Nat'l Bank
(In re Florida Group, Inc.), 123 B.R. 923, 924 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991)).
196. Hansen v. Finn (In re Curry & Sorenson), 57 B.R. 824, 828 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1986).
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estate. 'I This prerequisite ensures that decisions regarding the administration of the estate are first left to the debtor.'98
Although the law may differ among jurisdictions, the three steps for
bringing a creditors' committee action noted above generally should not be
regarded as rigid requirements; courts may permit committee-initiated
actions without first going through the formalities. For example, questions
regarding the committee's ability to sue on behalf of the estate usually arise
when the committee seeks to pursue avoiding power causes of action against
insiders. When such an action is brought against an insider, the creditors'
committee may be allowed to pursue colorable claims on behalf of the estate
without first making a demand upon the debtor, as such a demand would be
"futile" should the debtor be inclined to protect insiders. 1 This "futility
exception" for suits against insiders may be analogous to that in derivative
shareholder actions. 2" Just as some courts have yet to embrace the futility
exception in shareholder suits, it is unclear whether courts will uniformly
embrace the exception for committee actions on behalf of the estate.
Therefore, the prudent practice might be for a committee always to make a
demand upon the debtor. Doing so, however, may be impractical when
quick action is necessary. In order to forestall committee action, the debtor
may establish an independent committee or employ independent counsel for
the stated purpose of investigating the matter, but with the unstated intent
of indefinitely delaying a creditors' suit.
Following confirmation of a plan, the creditors' committee also may
obtain standing to pursue claims or causes of action as "representative of the
estate" if so provided in a plan of reorganization. 0 1 Such a provision
generally would eliminate any further demand requirement prior to the
commencement of an action.

197. See Unsecured Creditors Comm. of STN Enters. v. Noyes (In re STN Enters.),
779 F.2d 901, 906 (2d Cir. 1985).
198. Indeed, in In re Fugazy, 150 B.R. 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), the court
required a full hearing on the merits of a settlement proposed by the debtor before it
would permit the creditors to commence their own action on behalf of the estate.
199. See Louisiana World Exposition, Inc., 832 F.2d at 1397-98; In re First Capital
Holdings, 146 B.R. at 13.
200. In re First Capital Holdings, 146 B.R. at 11-13.
201. Nordberg v. Sanchez (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 813 F.2d 1177, 1180 n.1
(11th Cir. 1987); Creditor's Comm. v. Parks Jaggers Aerospace Co. (In re Parks Jaggers
Aerospace Co.), 129 B.R. 265 (M.D. Fla. 1991); see 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (1988);
cf. Foster Dev. Corp. v. Morning Treat Coffee Co. (In re Morning Treat Coffee Co.),

77 B.R. 62, 66-68 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1987) (holding that trustee's avoidance rights are
not property of the estate and, therefore, cannot be transferred pursuant to a plan of

reorganization).
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b. Standing to Intervene in an Adversary Proceeding
Substantial controversy exists concerning when a creditors' committee
may intervene in an adversary proceeding already commenced by the debtor
in possession or the trustee. This controversy has resulted principally from
different interpretations of section 1109(b), which provides: "A party in
interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity
security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any
indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in
2
a case under this chapter." D2
Some courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee v. Michaels (In re Malin Motor
Oil, Inc.),' have held that section 1109(b) gives a creditors' committee
an unconditional right to intervene in an adversary proceeding, reasoning
that such a proceeding comes within the broad meaning of "case" as used
in the statute. 2' Thus, while a committee's right to commence an adversary proceeding on behalf of the estate is restricted substantially, the right
to participate in an action already commenced by the debtor or a trustee may
be unconditional.
Other courts, however, including the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling v. Gulf Oil Corp.,2 5 have held
that section 1109(b) does not apply to adversary proceedings and, therefore,
that creditors' committees do not have an absolute statutory right to
intervene. According to the latter view, whether a creditors' committee may
intervene in an adversary proceeding depends on whether the a committee
would be permitted to do so under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which applies specifically to adversary proceedings through Rule
7024 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Thus, a creditors'
committee may intervene only if the interests of the committee are not
adequately represented therein,' or if, in the court's discretion, the

202. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1988).
203. 689 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).

204. Id. at 450; see also Sarah R. Neuman Found., Inc. v. Garrity (In re Neuman),
124 B.R. 155, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Parrot Packing Co., 42 B.R. 323 (N.D.
Ind. 1983); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Int'l, Inc. v. Mellon
Bank, N.A. (In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.), 107 B.R. 518 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that
equity committee possessed unconditional right to intervene in adversary proceeding
commenced by creditors' committee).
205. 762 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Kenan v. FDIC (In re George Rodman,
Inc.), 33 B.R. 348 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
206. Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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grounds for intervention outweigh any prejudice or delay caused by such
intervention.'
4. Committee's Role in the Plan Process
One of the principal duties of a creditors' committee is to "participate
in the formulation of a plan."" Before a committee may contribute
meaningfully to the plan process, it must exercise due diligence in
assembling the necessary data on which plan negotiations can be based.
Thus, as discussed above, the committee often will want to retain professionals such as attorneys, accountants, or investment advisors to represent
it in analyzing the debtor's financial condition and the operation of the
debtor's business. 9 These professionals should coordinate to analyze the
debtor's basic financial condition by examining the debtor's balance sheets,
income statements, cash flow projections, and, if one is available, business
plan. The committee's professionals also should work with the debtor's
professionals to generate whatever additional information is needed
depending on the size and complexity of the debtor's business. Committee
members should, however, carefully review their professionals' work and
circumscribe the tasks that may be undertaken. Otherwise, professional costs
may quickly spiral out of control, possibly consuming most unencumbered
assets of the estate.
While the debtor might cooperate with the committee's professionals to

action ... when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated

that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is
adequately represented by existing parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
207. Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an

action ... when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a
question of law or fact in common .... In exercising its discretion the court
shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (1988); see also Manville Corp. v. Equity See. Holders
Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 801 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that the

committee's power to exercise a voice in the formulation of a plan "is clearly a
desideratum under the program laid down by the Bankruptcy Code."); In re Structurlite
Plastics Corp., 91 B.R. 813, 819 (S.D. Ohio 1989) ("[Plarticipation in the formulation
of a plan represents the foremost of a committee's functions."). Participation in the plan
is also the principal purpose of an equity committee.
209. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) & (c)(2).
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evaluate the debtor's business as a going concern, the debtor is likely to be
less cooperative in providing information that would facilitate liquidation or
merger and acquisition transactions. Nevertheless, the committee and its
professionals must consider the best means of maximizing value for the
creditors represented with or without the debtor's support. This might
consist of selling parts of the business as distinct units, or piecemeal at
auction. On the other hand, value might be maximized by putting the entire
enterprise "in play" so new investors can seize control of ownership and
management of the business. The committee may instruct its professionals
to assemble a data base accessible to bona fide acquirors or investors on a
confidential basis. If the debtor is cooperative, confidentiality agreements
will be required of the committee, its professionals, and the potential
acquirors or investors. On the other hand, if the debtor is uncooperative,
Rule 2004 examinations, orders to produce documents, or other forms of
discovery may be necessary.210
If the debtor and the committee agree on a course of action, the result
may be a plan proposed by the debtor that is acceptable to the committee,
or a joint plan of reorganization where the committee is a co-proponent. If
the debtor refuses to cooperate, however, the committee may desire to do
more than simply obtain data through discovery. For example, the
committee might seek the appointment of a trustee or examiner under
section 1104.1 This is rarely done, however, because in most cases the
incremental cost outweighs the benefits of having a trustee or examiner. 1 2

210. See FD. R. BANKR. P. 2004, 7026-7037; see alsoIn re Structurlite Plastics, 91
B.R. at 819-20 (court ordered debtor to permit committee review of drafts of asset sale
agreements so that committee could develop an "informed position" on the proposed

sale); In re McLean Indus., 70 B.R. 852, 860 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the
"committee is . . . to be given notice of, and is expected to respond to, various
requests ... on which a committee position is crucial, such as sales of property out of
the ordinary course of business"); cf. In re Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc., 142 B.R. 918
(D. Idaho 1992) (denying committee permission to employ accountant to investigate
debtor's affairs).

211. Section 1104(a) provides that "on request of a party in interest" the court may,
after notice and a hearing, order the appointment of a trustee "for cause" or if such
appointment is in the best interests of creditors and equity security holders. 11 U.S.C.

§ 1104(a). Similarly, § 1104(b) provides that "a party in interest" may request the
appointment of an examiner, which the court may order after notice and a hearing, "to
conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate." Id. § 1104(b).

212. On the other hand, some courts have held that failure to move for the
appointment of a trustee diminishes the committee's ability to object to the debtor's
activities. See, e.g., In re After Six, Inc., 154 B.R. 876, 883 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993)
("Having neither sought to convert this case to a Chapter 7 case nor to appoint a trustee,
the committee has relegated its constituency to a position where, under the Code, its

views must be subjected to the deference to the Debtor's wishes."); cf. In re St. Mary
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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Another option is conversion or dismissal of the case under section
1112(b)13 Such a motion, however, is seldom in the best interest of the
214
committee because maximization of value rarely lies down this path.
Ultimately, the committee may conclude that the best way to maximize
creditor value is to pursue a creditors' plan of reorganization or liquidation.
A committee's ability to propose and confirm a plan is limited while the
debtor retains the exclusive right to propose a plan under section 1121.* s
If the creditors' committee is successful in terminating the plan exclusivity
period, or if exclusivity expires because the debtor fails to file a plan, to
obtain acceptances, or to obtain an extension in a timely fashion, it is
possible for the committee to be a proponent of a creditors' plan of
reorganization or liquidation.2 6 Debtors often will do whatever is necessary to file a plan before exclusivity expires. Therefore, committees
frequently make bargaining for termination of exclusivity a top priority
when it appears that the debtor is no longer cooperating with the committee.
A premature termination of exclusivity, however, may not be in the
committee's best interest, because it could lead to the filing of a plan by a
secured creditor who would seek to foreclose on the debtor's assets and
leave the unsecured creditors with little or nothing. Thus, on rare occasions,

Hosp., 86 B.R. 393, 396-97 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (debtor's discretion in setting the
direction of a case is diminished where a motion for appointment of a trustee is pending).
213. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b).
214. If the creditors' committee successfully converts or dismisses the case, the
committee ceases to function as an official committee. Thereafter, the debtor cannot be
compelled to compensate the committee's professionals. If the case is converted to one
under Chapter 7, creditors may elect a new committee under § 705 at the § 341(a)
meeting of creditors, but there is no authority for the Chapter 7 committee to employ
professionals. As noted, the duties of the Chapter 7 committee are more narrowly
circumscribed than those of a Chapter 11 committee.
215. 11 U.S.C. § 1121. The debtor may agree to file a plan of reorganization along
with the committee as co-proponent; doing so, however, will not terminate the debtor's
exclusive right. See generally In re Texaco Inc., 76 B.R. 322 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
216. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c):
Any party in interest, including ... a creditors' committee .... may file
a plan if and only if(1) a trustee has been appointed under this chapter;
(2) the debtor has not filed a plan before 120 days after the date of the
order for relief under this chapter; or
(3) the debtor has not filed a plan that has been accepted, before 180 days
after the date of the order for relief under this chapter, by each class of claims
or interests that is impaired under the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1121(c); see also Jasik v. Conrad (In re Jasik), 727 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.
1984) (holding that debtor's right to propose a plan was no longer exclusive where the
debtor failed to file a plan within the statutory period, failed to petition for an extension,
and failed to propose a plan before the trustee was appointed).
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a creditors' committee has persuaded the bankruptcy court to terminate
exclusivity on a selective basis whereby only the debtor or the creditors'
committee could propose a plan.2 7 While such a result might be desirable,
it does not appear to be authorized by the Bankruptcy Code, which by its
plain language appears to treat exclusivity as an all-or-nothing proposition.2"' Therefore, in most cases, the committee has to confront competing
plans as the price for being able to fie its own plan.
In formulating and negotiating a plan, a committee typically relies
extensively on its professional advisors for assistance. Often, a large
committee will also form a smaller plan-negotiation subcommittee to devote
the substantial time necessary to negotiate and confirm a creditors' plan. A
committee may consult with its principal constituents regarding the terms of
a plan,2" 9 although the committee cannot solicit actual votes until after a
disclosure statement has been approved by the court and disseminated with
the plan or a plan summary.'
Creditors' committees may also be concerned about assembling the
substantial body of information needed to prepare a disclosure statement to
accompany their plan. Experience teaches, however, that the professionals
can prepare an adequate disclosure statement, following the establishment
of a bar date for filing proofs of claim and any necessary discovery, 22' and
the burden to object to the disclosure statement at the hearing will be on the
debtor. If the debtor has been uncooperative in supplying information to the
committee, the court will probably order the debtor and its professionals to
provide language that will satisfy the debtor's objections. Moreover, the
committee may rely upon information contained in the debtor's own
disclosure statement if one is on file.
When the debtor has already filed a plan, it frequently will object to the
creditors' disclosure statement on the basis that the disclosure statement fails
to compare adequately the competing plans. This objection should be
overruled, however, because section 1125(a)(1) clearly states that a

217. See, e.g., In re Texaco Inc., 76 B.R. 322; In re United Press Int'l, Inc., 60
B.R. 265 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1986).
218. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121.

219. See Century Glove, Inc. v. First Am. Bank, 860 F.2d 94, 100-03 (3d Cir.
1988); Texas Extrusion Corp. v. Lockheed Corp. (In re Texas Extrusion Corp.), 844
F.2d 1142, 1162-63 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988).
220. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b).
221. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. Discovery may be required to
assemble an adequate data base to analyze claims. Without discovery, the committee may
not be able to prove that its plan meets the feasibility requirements of § 1129(a)(1 1),

because the total amount of allowed unsecured claims will be unknown. Discovery is
probably unnecessary, however, in the context of a "pot plan", in which a fixed amount
of cash, securities, and other property will be distributed pro rata to creditors.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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disclosure statement "need not include such information about any other
possible or proposed plan".m
Once the committee's disclosure statement is approved, the committee
may solicit acceptance of its plan and proceed toward confirmation.
Obtaining confirmation of a creditors' plan is usually difficult and time
consuming. The creditors' committee should be prepared to present evidence
supporting each confirmation requirement of section 1129(a) and, if
necessary, of section 1129(b). For example, to prove that the plan is
feasible, the creditors' committee may need to conduct a claims analysis.
This may not be easy, however, if the debtor's books and records are in
disarray or if the court refuses to establish a bar date. Also, as a practical
matter, the creditors' committee must be prepared to accomplish an orderly
transition of control of the debtor's business. This can be accomplished by
establishing a shadow management and drafting a detailed plan and
confirmation order dealing with custody of the debtor's books, records, and
other assets. The Bankruptcy Code contains broad powers regarding the
implementation of a plan that the creditors' committee should be prepared
to utilize on short notice if necessary.'
At this point it is not uncommon for the debtor to file a competing plan,
if one has not already been fied. The committee may encounter particular
difficulty when a debtor's plan is competing for confirmation. If both plans
meet the confirmation requirements of section 1129,"~ the court must
consider, but is not bound by, the "preferences" of creditors and equity
security holders. In most cases, courts seem inclined to confirm the plan that
is in the best interest of the creditors regardless of the votes of equity
holders.' It is interesting to note that the creditors do not always prefer

222. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1); see, e.g., Kirk v. Texaco Inc., 82 B.R. 678, 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). This language was added to § 1125(a)(1) in 1984. Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, sec. 509,
§1125(a), 98 Stat. 333, 385. This amendment was in response to decisions that required
information about competing plans to be included in a disclosure statement. See, e.g.,
In re Werth, 29 B.R. 220, 222 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (requiring discussion of the
differences between two competing plans proposed by the debtor in possession).
223. 11 U.S.C. § 1142. State corporation laws may also aid the transition of
corporate governance. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 303 (1991); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 1400 (West 1990).
224. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(c).
225. See, e.g., In re Texas Extrusion Corp., 844 F.2d at 1159 ("It must be
remembered that in the bankruptcy context, the interests of creditors not the debtors are
paramount."); In re Sound Radio, Inc., 93 B.R. 849, 858 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) ("While
it is necessary to consider the various competing interests carefully, the court must take
all of them into account and proceed with what is in the best interest of the creditors.").
Rule 3018(c) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure permits preferences to be
expressed only if acceptances are cast for more than one plan. Form 14 of the Official
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a creditors' plan over the debtor's plan, particularly when the committee
proposes a plan that is better suited to the interests of its own members than
of the unsecured creditors as a whole.'
If the debtor gets a late start in the plan process, it may bring a motion
under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7042 to consolidate hearings
on the confirmation of competing plans. 7 In most cases, however, such
a motion will be unnecessary because the bankruptcy court, on its own
motion, will set a scheduling order to conduct simultaneous confirmation
hearings. Indeed, an argument can be made that such a result is mandated
because the Bankruptcy Code requires the court to consider the "preferences" of creditors and equity security holders with respect to competing plans.
This was the typical practice under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, where
courts often felt compelled to submit all approved plans (i.e., plans that
were fair, equitable, and feasible) to the creditors and equity holders for
their consideration.2 ' On the other hand, at least one court has held that
it is not necessary to delay confirmation of the creditors' plan to allow the
debtor time to catch up. Such a delay can prove fatal if the creditor's plan
involves a time-of-the essence acquisition or investment. 2 9 Nevertheless,
in the interests of judicial economy and in order to give creditors a choice,
most competing plans will proceed concurrently toward confirmation.
Sometimes debtors challenge creditors' liquidating plans on the basis
that the plans are not proposed in good faith as required by section
1129(a)(3)." 3 ° The court will not refuse to confirm a creditors' liquidating
plan when the creditors have a firm offer to purchase and when the debtor's
competing plan offers creditors a higher price but is based on a contingent
contract.2 3' The court may even confirm a creditors' plan that transfers
Forms contains a similar restriction on the ballot used with competing plans. However,
even if a creditor rejects both plans, the creditor should be permitted to express a
preference if both plans are nevertheless confirmable. Rule 9009 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure permits the ballot to be altered to accommodate such a situation.
226. See, e.g., In re Rolling Green Country Club, 26 B.R. 729 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1982) (where unsecured creditors' committee objected to bank's plan but withdrew

objections to debtor's plan, the court confirmed debtor's plan rather than bank's plan).
227. This was done, for example, in an unreported opinion in the Kendavis case. In

re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, No. 385-30348-M-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); for the
underlying facts of this case, see In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, 91 B.R. 742, 745 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1988).
228. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 949, 952 (D.N.J. 1974).
229. See In re Harcom, Inc., 79 B.R. 137 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987). Likewise, the
committee cannot be assured that the court will delay confirmation of the debtor's plan
to permit the committee to catch up, particularly when to do so would simply negate the
timing advantage Congress purposefully gave debtors through exclusivity.
230. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).
231. In re Holywell Corp., 54 B.R. 41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd sub nom.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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control of the business to the creditors and settles lawsuits against the
creditors who are proponents of the plan."~
In sum, a creditors' committee can achieve, in certain cases, confirmation of a creditors' plan. The committee's professionals must be careful,
however, to conduct a campaign to confirm the creditors' plan with utmost
care. Otherwise, the committee's members and its professionals could be
subjected to liability, as discussed below."i Where the committee represents creditors in several affiliated cases, the committee may need to retain
separate professionals to represent "subcommittees" for each estate where
interestate conflicts exist. Committee professionals, especially attorneys who
operate under the adversary system's rules of ethics, must also avoid
interestate conflicts of interest. A similar situation arises when the same
committee represents senior and subordinated debt. Committee professionals
must steer clear of intra-committee disputes and make sure that decisions
affecting substantive rights are made by the committee itself, not by its
professionals.
B. FiduciaryDuties of Committee Members
1. Scope of FiduciaryDuties
It is well established that creditors' committee members are to be
treated as fiduciaries: "[M]embers of a creditors' committee are obligated
to act in a fiduciary capacity and may not use their positions as committee
members to advance only their individual interests."" As a fiduciary, a
committee member owes duties of care, loyalty, and obedience to the
committee's constituents." 5 The duty of obedience requires the member
to act within the constraints of the applicable statutes and rules; the duty of
loyalty precludes self-dealing; and the duty of care requires the member to
act as a prudent person. As the court in the Johns-Manville case noted:

Holywell Corp. v. Bank of N.Y., 59 B.R. 340 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
232. See, e.g., In re Evans Prods. Co., 65 B.R. 31 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), aft'd, 65 B.R.

87 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
233. See Luedke v. Delta Air Lines, 159 B.R. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Central

Transp., Inc. v. Roberto (In re Tucker Freight Lines), 62 B.R. 213 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1986); In re Ligon, 50 B.R. 127 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985); see also infra notes 234-249
and accompanying text.

234. In re Map Int'l, Inc., 105 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (citing In re Enduro
Stainless, Inc., 59 B.R. 603 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986)); In re National Equip. & Mold
Corp., 33 B.R. 574 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
235. United Steel Workers v. Lampl (In re Mesta Mach. Co.), 67 B.R. 151, 159
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (committee breached duty by proposing modifications to plan

to reduce distribution to class); In re National Equip. & Mold Corp., 33 B.R. 574.
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In the case of reorganization committees, . . fiduciary duties are
crucial because of the importance of committees. Reorganization
committees are the primary negotiating bodies for the plan of reorganization [representing] those classes of creditors from which they are
selected. They also provide supervision of the debtor and execute an
oversight function in protecting their constituents' interests ....
Accordingly, the individuals constituting a committee should be honest,
loyal, trustworthy and without conflicting interests, and with undivided
6
loyalty and allegiance to their constituents.23

Courts have held, almost uniformly, that a committee member owes
duties only to members of the creditors' class that the committee represents. 37 These holdings follow the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. ,2s which held that a committee
owes no duties to the debtor or to the estate in general. Thus, committee
members usually need only be concerned with the interests of unsecured
creditors generally, and need not be concerned with how the committee's

actions may affect other parties in interest. Moreover, a number of courts
have held that committee members are entitled to a "qualified" or "limited"
immunity from liability resulting from actions taken within the scope of their
statutory duties.3 9 As long as the committee's actions in connection with

236. Johns-Manville Corp. v. Doan (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 919, 925
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). Note that although a committee member must advance the
interests of the committee's constituents in committee meetings, the member may
nonetheless take positions contrary to those of the committee while acting in its capacity
as an individual creditor. See In re Central Medical Ctr., Inc., 122 B.R. 568, 570-71
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990); In re American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 30 B.R.
772, 775-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
237. Official, Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Stem (In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984
F.2d 1305, 1315 (lst Cir. 1993); In re Seaescape Cruises, Ltd., 131 B.R. 241 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1991); In re First RepublicBank Corp., 95 B.R. 58 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988);
United Steelworkers v. Lampl (In re Mesta Mach. Co.), 67 B.R. 151 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1986); In re Tucker Freight Lines, 62 B.R. at 216; cf Luedke v. Delta Air Lines, 159
B.R. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (committee may owe duties to all parties in interest as a plan
proponent).
238. 312 U.S. 262, 268-69 (1941).
239. See Luedke v. Delta Air Lines, 159 B.R. at 391-93; In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 717, 722 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 140 B.R. 347
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Tucker Freight Lines, 62 B.R. at 216; cfI. Prince v. Zazove, 959
F.2d 1395, 1401 (7th Cir. 1992) (committee members will not be held liable for the
tortious acts of committee counsel, absent evidence of direct involvement in the tortious
conduct by committee members).
In Tucker FreightLines,the debtor's sole shareholder, which was also an unsecured
creditor, filed suit against the committee members, alleging that the members tortiously
caused a denial of the debtor's plan and the eventual conversion of the debtor's case to
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/10
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the administration of the estate do not rise to the level of willful misconduct,
its members generally should be shielded from liability. This rule serves the
important purposes of encouraging creditors not only to serve on committees, but also to take an active role in the case.2'
Despite the weight of authority that appears to be geared toward
protecting committee members from liability, a recent decision from the
Southern District of New York may cause unsecured creditors to pause
before accepting a committee appointment. In Luedke v. Delta Air
Lines,24 former Pan Am employees filed an action against Delta Air Lines
("Delta") for lost wages, benefits, and other monetary losses stemming from
Delta's alleged breach of an agreement to support Pan Am's reorganization
efforts. Delta filed a third-party complaint against, inter alia, the Pan Am
creditors' committee and its individual members for contribution and
indemnity, alleging that the committee's members "thrust themselves into
the center of the negotiation and contracting process to such an extent that
they usurped the roles of Pan Am as debtor in possession."242 Delta
further alleged that the committee through its actions had become a "joint
proponent" of Pan Am's plan and had used its position to thwart the
reorganization process. According to Delta:
the Committee and its members acted beyond the scope of their statutory
duties and in breach of the duties they assumed as joint proponents of
the Joint Plan. . . by manipulating the reorganization process without
regard for the viability of a reorganized Pan Am or the feasibility of the
proposed plan of reorganization so as to improve at any cost their
potential recovery. Such conduct by the Committee and its members
allegedly had the effect of causing, in whole or in substantial
part, Pan
243
Am's inability to continue operations and to reorganize.
In denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim by the
Chapter 7. The committee members moved for summary judgment, contending that they
were immune from liability for their actions while serving on the committee. Although

recognizing a "limited immunity" for committee members, the court held that such
immunity would not apply to reckless or intentional conduct, as was alleged in the action.
62 B.R. at 216. In reaching this decision, the court relied in part on the fact that the
Bankruptcy Code protects committee members who participate in the plan solicitation
process from liability under the sedurities laws, provided that the members act in good
faith. See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e) (1988)).
240. But see Luedke v. Delta Air Lines, 159 B.R. at 393 n.4 ("[The absence of
immunity is unlikely to discourage creditors from volunteering for committees in view
of creditors' economic incentives to increase recovery on their claims.").
241. 159 B.R. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
242. Id. at 388 (internal quotations omitted).
243. Id. at 389 (internal quotations omitted).
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committee and its members, the court held that by becoming a plan
proponent, the committee assumed fiduciary duties to all parties to Pan
Am's reorganization, not just the unsecured creditors. The court further held
that, assuming Delta's allegations that the committee interfered with the plan
process were true, the committee's members would not be entitled to
immunity for their "wilful misconduct and other ultra vires actions. "244
Although Luedke v. Delta Air Lines involved claims for monetary
damages, the Code provides a number of other possibilities to remedy a
committee member's breach of duty, including designation and exclusion of
the member's vote on a plan,24 or equitable subordination of the member's claims.246 Moreover, as discussed above, the U.S. Trustee may force
a member to resign or may remove a member from the committee.247
These remedies, however, prescribe no penalty if the committee member
liquidates its entire position. In addition, while such remedies may serve the
goals of deterrence or, perhaps, punishment for improper conduct, they
often will do little or nothing to compensate those directly injured by the
breach of duty. Thus, in many cases, awards for monetary damages may
constitute the best remedy available despite the obvious chilling effect this
may have on committee membership.
Because the scope of their potential liability is uncertain, committees
frequently seek to include provisions in plans of reorganization exculpating
committee members from anything other than willful misconduct. Courts
have confirmed many plans that exculpate the committee and its members,
and at least one court in a reported opinion has overruled objections to such
an exculpation.248 Moreover, it appears that committee members may
benefit from the "safe harbor" provision in section 1125(e) for good-faith
solicitation of acceptances or rejections of a plan and participation in
securities transactions contemplated by a plan.249

244. Id. at 394 (internal quotations omitted).
245. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c), (e)
(1988).
246. Id. § 510(c).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 165-169.
248. See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 717 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 140 B.R. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (confirming plan that both released
members of equity committee from liability except for willful misconduct and enjoined

suits for any reason against committee members).
249. Section 1125(e) provides:
A person that solicits acceptance or rejection of a plan, in good faith and

in compliance with the applicable provisions of this title, or that participates,
in good faith and in compliance with the applicable provisions of this title, in
the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of a security, offered or sold under the
plan, of the debtor, of an affiliate participating in a joint plan with the debtor,

or of a newly organized successor to the debtor under the plan, is not liable,
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2. Special Problems of Claims Trading
An issue receiving significant attention in recent years is whether
committee members may purchase or sell claims against the debtor. 0 The
concerns are not only that committee members will often have a trading
advantage due to their access to significant, nonpublic information, but also
that a committee member's votes might be influenced by its claims trading
activities. No reported decisions exist under the Code considering the merits
of claims trading by committee members. Members, however, would be
well advised against engaging in activity that suggests profiting from their
position of trust. For members in the regular business of trading securities
for their client's accounts, this may place an insurmountable burden on
committee membership. While no court has considered the issue in a
reported decision, a committee member who is trading securities for its
customers may possibly do so without breach of duty if the member employs
a proper information-blocking device and files evidence of the device with
the bankruptcy court." 1
C. Committee Decision Making
Although the Bankruptcy Code and Rules set forth many of the
committee's rights and responsibilities, they say little about how the
committee should carry out its tasks. In larger cases creditors' committees
routinely meet about once a month, possibly with subgroups working on
specific projects during the interim. However, with the exception of section
1103(a), which provides limited procedures for the selection of committee

on account of such solicitation or participation, for violation of any applicable
law, rule, or regulation governing solicitation of acceptance or rejection of a
plan or the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of securities.
11 U.S.C. § 1125(e).
250. See In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (persons
who are privy to inside information should not engage in claims trading for purpose of
controlling reorganization process). Members who sell all of their claims should resign
from the creditors' committee immediately. No right exists that allows the purchaser of
a member's claims to assume that member's seat on the committee; if the purchaser is
to serve on the committee, the U.S. Trustee must appoint the purchaser.
251. In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 1-90-00130, 1991 WL 79143 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 1991); cf. In re Midland United Co., 64 F. Supp. 399, 417 (D. Del.
1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1947) (committee members not disqualified from
receiving compensation when customers of brokerages in which members were partners
traded securities of debtor).
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professionals," 2 neither the Code nor the Rules specify when and where
committee meetings should take place, or how decisions should be made at
those meetings.
One of the first concerns of any creditors' committee should be the
adoption of by-laws. Committee by-laws may govern such matters as the
rights of nonvoting members, the duties of committee officers, meeting
times and locations, persons permitted to attend meetings, voting procedures, and expense reimbursement guidelines. By deciding these matters
early, a committee may avoid conflict at a time when the committee should
be presenting a united front in its negotiations with the debtor and secured
creditors.
Although the courts generally steer clear of internal committee affairs,
they have, on occasion, resolved disputes among committee members,
typically involving disagreements over voting. In light of congressional
concern for "representative" committees expressed in section 1102, some
courts have imposed minimum quotas or super-majority voting requirements
for critical committee decisions. For example, in In re Outdoor Displays
Welding & Fabrication, Inc. 53 the court considered whether committee
counsel was properly selected when a majority of the committees' members
voted in favor of employing counsel, but the holders of a majority of the
claims held by committee members voted against counsel's retention. The
court imposed a "double majority" requirement in the form of a "general
rule that for purposes of committee action to select counsel, the votes of a
majority in number of creditors present holding more than one-half in
amount of claims represented at the meeting will be required."" The
court tempered its holding, however, by noting that in any given case "the
final test of the sufficiency of a vote must rest with the Court, and must be
tailored to the facts in each case.'"25
One might wonder whether the OutdoorDisplays holding makes sense,
given that each committee member is obligated to act as a representative of
all creditors and not on behalf of its own pecuniary interests. For that
reason, the weight of a committee member's vote should not depend on the
magnitude of that member's claims. In practice, seasoned committee counsel

252. Section 1103(a) provides:
At a scheduled meeting of a committee appointed under section 1102 of
this title, at which a majority of the members of such committee are present,
and with the court's approval, such committee may select and authorize the
employment by such committee of one or more attorneys, accountants, or
other agents, to represent or perform services for such committee.

11 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
253. 76 B.R. 860 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1987).
254. Id. at 862.
255. Id.
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provides voting rules in the committee's by-laws that are almost always
adopted unanimously. Experience teaches that "one person, one vote,"
regardless of the size of claim, is the standard adopted in most cases. 6
Finally, committees should form subcommittees, particularly for
negotiating a plan of reorganization. In most cases, it is simply too
cumbersome to have an entire committee negotiate a plan directly with the
debtor and other parties in interest. As a consequence, often the committee's
professionals, rather than its members, set the negotiating strategy for the
committee without sufficient input from their client. By creating a plan
negotiation subcommittee, at least some committee members can actively
participate in the negotiation process, adding both insight and accountability
to the committee's position.
D. Committees and the Attorney/Client Privilege
The need for frank and competent legal representation necessitates that
communications between a committee's attorney and its members be subject
to the attorney/client privilege. Whether such communications are privileged, however, has only occasionally been addressed by the courts, most
recently by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re Subpoenas
Duces Tecum.u 7 In that case, the Ninth Circuit vacated a civil contempt

judgment against counsel for a creditors' committee imposed after counsel
refused to produce documents relating to communications with the
committee. Following what appears to be the majority view, the court held
that, at least when a committee is in the midst of adversarial litigation,
communications between committee members and committee counsel may
be subject to the attorney/client privilege."

256. See In re Schatz Fed. Bearings Co., 5 B.R. 543, 548 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(implying that one person, one vote rule is appropriate).
257. 978 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1992).
258. Id. at 1161; see In re Century Glove, Inc., 74 B.R. 952, 957 (Bankr. D. Del.
1987) (finding that a letter drafted by committee counsel to committee members was
privileged communication), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. First Am. Bank v.
Century Glove, Inc., 81 B.R. 274 (D. Del. 1988), aff'd in part, 860 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.
1988); see also In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 133 B.R. 13, 31 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that time record entries referring to privileged communications
may be excised from a committee professional's record); In re Baldwin-United Corp.,
38 B.R. 802, 804-05 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (communications between creditors'
committee counsel and members may be subject to privilege); In re Jensen-Farley
Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 583 n.29 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (same). But see In re
Christian Life Ctr. First Assembly of God, 16 B.R. 35, 37 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1981) ("It
would thus seem where the committee does not have the power to act or the title of a
trustee that it wouldn't need or deserve the attorney-client privilege since they should
make their activities known to the other creditors and to the Court."), overruled,at least
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A more difficult question is whether the attorney/client privilege applies
to communications with creditors who are constituents of the creditors'
committee but who are not members of the committee, or who are merely
nonvoting (or ex-officio) members. Courts have held that the creditors'
committee's attorney has at least a fiduciary, and perhaps an attorney/client
relationship with all members of the creditor class that the committee
represents.1 9 If so, communications between committee counsel and
unsecured creditors arguably are subject to the attorney/client privilege, at
least when such communications can reasonably be expected to remain
confidential.
In In re Baldwin-United Corp.,2 the creditors' committee sought to
exclude nonvoting members from its meetings because the nonvoting
members were not necessary to the committee's functions. The creditors'
committee reasoned that the presence of nonvoting members during
committee deliberations would destroy the attorney/client privilege. The
nonvoting members countered that no such privilege existed to destroy,
because committee members had a fiduciary responsibility to communicate
openly with all creditors.26 Recognizing the committee's duties to its
constituents, the Baldwin-Unitedcourt nevertheless found the attorney/client
privilege to apply:
While we are cognizant of the fiduciary responsibilities which a
creditors' committee owes to those it represents, we are unconvinced
that the attorney/client privilege is inherently antagonistic to those
responsibilities. The purposes underlying the privilege have no less
applicability to a creditors' committee than they do to any other entity,
at least when disclosure of privileged communications is sought by those
who are not represented by the committee, or who stand in an adversarial relationship with it. If the committee cannot engage in "full
and frank communications" with its attorneys without fear of disclosure
to such outsiders, then its work may be seriously hampered, to the
detriment of those it represents.262
The court also found that the presence of nonvoting members would not

in part, by In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 978 F.2d at 1161-62.
259. See In re Celotex Corp., 123 B.R. 917, 921 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Pincus, Verlin, Hahn, Reich & Goldstein Professional Corp., 42
B.R. 960, 963 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
260. 38 B.R. 802 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
261. Cf. In re Christian Life Ctr., 16 B.R. at 37 (suggesting that because the
committee owes duties to all creditors, it must make its activities known to creditors and
the court).
262. 38 B.R. at 804-05.
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destroy the privilege. 263 In dictum, however, the court tempered its
decision by recognizing that, regardless of the privilege, a committee's
constituents have limited rights of access to otherwise privileged communications: "While the privilege may be absolute as to those who are not
represented by the creditors' committee, we believe that a narrower
construction of the privilege is required where disclosure is sought by those
who are so represented."2'

Perhaps the most difficult question is whether the attorney/client
privilege, or some other privilege, applies to communications between the
debtor in possession and the creditors' committee. Frequently in the course
of plan negotiations, the debtor in possession must share confidential
information with the committee. In such cases, the debtor in possession will
usually request that members of the committee sign a confidentiality
agreement as a condition to dissemination of confidential information. The
information may even include analyses from counsel for the debtor in
possession with respect to a plan of reorganization. Does dissemination of
such information to the committee result in a waiver of the attorney/client
privilege so that the information may be obtained by a third-party litigant?
This issue was addressed in an unpublished order in Norfin, Inc. & Snellman
v. AM Int'l, Inc. (In re AM Int'l, Inc.),26 in which District Judge Bua
held that "[b]ecause of the common legal interest of AM International, Inc.
and the unsecured creditors' committee in this litigation, the sharing of
information among AM International, the Committee and their respective
counsel is privileged from discovery." 2" It remains to be seen whether
other courts will recognize a claim of privilege when attorney/client
privileged documents are disseminated from the debtor in possession,
trustee, or examiner to the creditors' committee.267
263. Id. at 806. The result may be different, however, where the nonvoting member
has not been officially appointed to the committee, particularly if the nonvoting member
is a secured creditor.
264. Id. at 805; see also In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 978 at 1160 (appearing to
reserve the question whether a committee's attorney/client privilege could be asserted
against those who have a "fiduciary relation to the Committee or its counsel").
265. No. 80-C-6824 (N.D. Ill.
June 26, 1984).
266. Id. (citing United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979)); cf. In re
Christian Life Ctr., 16 B.R. at 38 (holding that there is no "work-product privilege of
the individual members of the Creditors' Committee").
267. In Official Unsecured Creditor's Comm. v. Canadian Pac. Forest Prods., Ltd.
(In re Gibson Group, Inc.), 158 B.R. 101 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993), the court denied a
request for a protective order limiting the scope of discovery regarding a transaction
between the debtor and a member of the committee. There was no suggestion in that
case, however, that the transactions involved a privileged communication between the
debtor and the committee.
Outside the bankruptcy context, some courts have found a "business strategy"
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Given that committee counsel has an attorney/client relationship with
committee members, it logically follows that ethical rules governing
communications with adverse parties restrict the debtor's counsel from
communicating with committee members without prior approval of
committee counsel. In In re Snyder,2 68 the debtor and his counsel invited
creditors and, specifically, members of the creditors' committee to attend a
meeting regarding the debtor's various proposals for plans of reorganization.
Counsel for the committee objected to the meeting on the ground that it
violated the restrictions on solicitation under section 1125(b) and that it
constituted an improper communication between debtor's attorney and the
committee members. While finding no violation of section 1125(b) on the
facts of the case, the court did find that debtor's counsel had committed an
ethical violation by communicating directly with committee members.26 9
In so holding, the court relied upon Rule 7-104(A)(1) of Utah's version of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and, by analogy, Rule 4.2 of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.270 While this holding appears
correct, what follows in the Snyder court's decision is highly troubling:
Where the creditors' committee has employed an attorney pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 1103(a), this Court holds that the debtormay not communicate
with members of the committee without the prior consent of the
committee's attorney or an orderof the Court. The debtor's attorney is
privilege to apply to communications of strategic business plans, proposals, or
alternatives prepared in connection with a contest for corporate control. See, e.g.,
Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 141 F.R.D. 408,418-20 (M.D.N.Y. 1992); Temple Holdings Ltd.
v. Sea Containers Ltd., 131 F.R.D. 360, 360-61 (D.D.C. 1989); BNS, Inc. v. Koppers
Co., 683 F. Supp. 455, 457-58 (D. Del. 1988). It remains to be seen whether the
bankruptcy courts will adopt the "business strategy" privilege to negotiations between
committees and debtors-in-possession. Subject to safeguards such as the opportunity for
in camera review, such a privilege could help to facilitate plan negotiations.
268. 51 B.R. 432 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).
269. Id. at 439.
270. Rule 7-104 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides, in
relevant part:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that
matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other
party or is authorized by law to do so.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (1980). Rule 4.2 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall
not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows
to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of
the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."
CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1983).

MODEL RULES OF
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also precluded from communicating with individual creditors without
obtaining the prior consent of their respective attorneys. 271
While the court may have had good intentions, the emphasized language that
bans both the debtor and its attorney from communicating with committee
members is at odds with the statutory right of the committee to consult with
the debtor in possession regarding case administration27 and appears not
to be followed in practice. In fact, if the debtor is a public corporation, the
securities laws may require communications with creditors who are
securities holders. In any event, it seems both unnecessary and unreasonable
to hold debtors to the same ethical rules regarding communications as their
attorneys in this context.
E. Reimbursement of Committee Members
Creditors' committee members clearly are not entitled to compensation
for their time or services while serving on a committee. A split of authority
exists, however, concerning whether members of an official creditors'
committee are entitled to reimbursement from the debtor's estate for
members' out-of-pocket expenses. Prior to the enactment of the Code, the
expenses of creditors' committee members could be recovered from the
estate in Chapter X1 cases under former Bankruptcy Rule 11-29(c). Today,
however, there is no provision in the Code or in the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure expressly authorizing such reimbursement. Section
503(b)(3)(D) provides that a committee "other than a committee appointed
under section 1102" may receive compensation for its "actual, necessary
expenses" if it makes a "substantial contribution" to the case.27 3 Additionally, section 330(a)(1) enables the professionals employed by an official
committee to be compensated from the estate.274 Neither of these provisions, however, plainly authorizes reimbursement of expenses of committees
formed pursuant to section 1102.
The courts which have held that committee members are not entitled to
any reimbursement of expenses have generally relied upon the plain
language of sections 330 and 503, as well as the general principle that
Congress must expressly provide for the payment of monies from the
estate.275 The reasoning is that sections 330 and 503(b)(3)(D) illustrate that

271. 51 B.R. at 439 (emphasis added).
272. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1988).
273. Id. § 503(b)(3)(D).
274. Id. § 330(a)(1).
275. See In re UNR Indus., 736 F.2d 1136, 1141 (7th Cir. 1984) (denying
compensation under § 330 only); In re Southern Commodity Corp., 96 B.R. 392, 396
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Congress knew how to authorize reimbursement when it wanted to.
Therefore, some courts have concluded, Congress decided not to provide for
reimbursement to members of official committees.
Notwithstanding the absence of express statutory authority to reimburse
committee members, the apparent trend is toward allowing such reimbursement. Courts have generally reasoned that if professionals and members of
unofficial committees not appointed under section 1102 are entitled to
reimbursement of expenses, members of official committees should likewise
be entitled.276
Perhaps the most reasoned approach to allowing such payment has been
expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which considered
the issue not once but twice in In re George Worthington Co. 277 The latter
opinion came after the Sixth Circuit vacated its first effort at resolving this

(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (denying compensation under any section of the Code); In re
Mison's Nursing Ctr., Inc., 73 B.R. 360, 362-63 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (same); In re

Beck-RumbaughAssocs., 68 B.R. 882, 885-86 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that any
request for compensation not expressly authorized by the Code would be denied), aft'd,
84 B.R. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
In UNR Indus., the Seventh Circuit considered whether committee members who
employed their own attorneys were entitled to reimbursement under § 330. The
committee in UNR Indus. sought reimbursement pursuant to Rule 2016(a) of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which outlines procedures for professionals seeking
compensation under § 330. The advisory committee's note to Rule 2016(a) states that the
rule's provisions apply to, inter alia, reimbursement for a committee.
Declining to follow the advisory committee's note, the Seventh Circuit held that
Rule 2016(a) merely sets forth the requirements for making an application for
reimbursement of expenses under § 330. According to the court, § 330 provides a
substantive basis only for reimbursement of the compensation of professionals employed
by the committee, not for reimbursement to the members of an official creditors'
committee. Thus, the Seventh Circuit correctly held that, because the substantive basis
for reimbursement of creditors' committee expenses does not appear in § 330, Rule
2016(a) may not be relied upon to provide such a basis. 736 F.2d at 1141; see also 28
U.S.C. § 2075 (1988); FED. R. BANKRn. P. 9030. The Seventh Circuit expressly declined
to consider whether the members' expenses could be reimbursed as general administrative
expenses under § 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 736 F.2d at 1139.
276. See In re George Worthington Co., 921 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1990); In re I.E.
Jennings, Inc., 96 B.R. 500, 504 (E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Evans Prods. Co., 62 B.R. 579
(S.D. Fla. 1986) (equity committee); In re National Enters., 140 B.R. 871 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1992); In re Northeast Dairy Coop. Fed'n, Inc., 76 B.R. 914, 916 (Bankr. N.D.
N.Y. 1987); In re Aviation Technical Support, Inc., 72 B.R. 32 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1987); see also In re Windsor Communications Group, Inc., 54 B.R. 504 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1985) (allowing reimbursement, but only when committee members provide services
to the estate far beyond mere service on the committee).
277. 913 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter George Worthington 1]; 921 F.2d 626
(6th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter George Worthington II].
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issue. In George Worthington committee members incurred expenses of
about $17,000 during the course of the case, principally related to travel. A
majority of the Sixth Circuit panel first affirmed the bankruptcy court's
decision to deny reimbursement, holding that no payments may be made
from the estate without "clear and specific authority in the Bankruptcy
Code. "278 Following- a petition for rehearing and amicus briefs filed by the
official committee in the Allied Stores/Federatedcases and the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Sixth Circuit vacated its opinion. On rehearing
the court held that, while the Code did not explicitly provide for reimbursement of committee expenses, reimbursement could be justified as falling
within section 503(b)(1)(A)'s definition of "actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate."279
VI. POSTCONFIRMATION COMMITTEES

Just as the Code is silent on when the debtor in possession ceases to
exist, so too is the Code silent on when the creditors' committee ceases to
function. While the cases are not entirely clear, it appears that the committee dissolves upon conversion or dismissal of the case, rather than on
confirmation of a plan." ° A well-crafted plan of reorganization should
resolve this issue by specifying when the committee ceases to exist.2 1 This
is particularly important when a plan permits a committee to serve
postconfirmation as "representative of the estate."'
VIi. CONCLUSION

Although the courts have considered many issues with respect to

278. George Worthington , 913 F.2d at 325.
279. George Worthington H, 921 F.2d at 632.
280. See Creditors' Comm. v. Parks Jaggers Aerospace Co. (In re Parks Jaggers
Aerospace Co.), 129 B.R. 265 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that creditors' committee does
not automatically dissolve at the time Chapter 11 plan is confirmed, but dissolves when
case is dismissed or converted; committee may act after confirmation and may obtain
compensation for necessary legal work performed between time plan is confirmed and
consummated); Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Siskind (In re Erie Hilton Joint
Ventures), 137 B.R. 165 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992) (creditors' committee has standing to
sue to compel capital infusions required by Chapter 11 plan); Unsecured Creditors
Comm. of Butler Group v. Butler (In re Butler), 94 B.R. 433 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989)
(once bankruptcy case is dismissed, statute under which committee was created during
bankruptcy no longer applies, and the committee automatically dissolves).
281. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (1988).
282. Nordberg v. Sanchez (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 813 F.2d 1177, 1180 n.1
(11th Cir. 1987); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1103(c)(5), 1123(b)(3)(B).
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creditors' committees during the first fifteen years of practice under the
Bankruptcy Code, the courts have yet to develop much jurisprudence
concerning many important issues involving the committee's membership,
operation, and duties. Perhaps the sophistication of the committee's
members and professionals accounts for this paucity of case law. While the
law will continue to evolve and answer some of the questions posed by this
Article, it may be several years before all of these questions are addressed
at the bankruptcy court level, much less by the courts of appeals. Until then,
much of the law regarding creditors' committees will remain unreported and
uncertain.
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